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INTRODUCTION 
In 1872, an American newspaper called the Woman’s Exponent 
began publication.  The Exponent’s subtitle trumpeted “the Rights of 
Women of all Nations,”1 and during more than forty years of twice-
monthly publication, the paper remained focused on women’s issues 
in a “tone . . . neither self-conscious nor cautious, and it firmly and 
directly discussed feminist ideas . . . .”2  For example, one early 
column asserted that “[w]oman was designed to be something more 
than a domestic drudge,”3 and a few years later, in 1877, the paper 
editorialized: “Woman feels her servitude, her degradation, and she is 
determined to assert her rights.”4 
The editors of the Exponent shared the convictions of many 
nineteenth-century feminists, echoing in print the credo of the 
famous feminist and suffragette Elizabeth Cady Stanton that 
“[w]omen must stand up and speak for themselves.”5  To that end, 
the paper regularly “reported on the triumphs of women around the 
globe in achieving special awards or recognition.”6  In one story about 
a young San Francisco girl who had won an academic competition for 
a trip to Paris, the Exponent writer proclaimed that this was “quite a 
victory for the girls, and proves the oft repeated assertion that the 
brains of girls are not inferior to the brains of boys!”7  The Exponent 
also reported “progress made in the area of women’s rights around 
the country and around the world,” often reprinting speeches given at 
women’s political gatherings.8  In 1890, the paper devoted a long 
article to documenting “the need for equal pay for equal work,”9 and, 
                                                          
 1. See Judith Rasmussen Dushku, Feminists, in MORMON SISTERS: WOMEN IN 
EARLY UTAH 177, 178-79 (Claudia L. Bushman ed., Utah State Univ. Press 2d ed. 
1997) (1976) (contending that the history of the Exponent in advocating for 
women’s rights demonstrated the commitment of Mormon women to the larger 
national women’s movement). 
 2. See id. at 178 (arguing that because the Mormon women writers of the 
Exponent believed their gospel ideals upheld feminist ideas, these women were not 
afraid to address feminist issues directly). 
 3. See id. at 183 (illustrating the Utah feminists’ desire to speak out against 
injustice and for the equality of men and women). 
 4. See id. at 178 (emphasizing the forthrightness of the Mormon writers of the 
Exponent). 
 5. See id. at 181 (comparing Stanton to the editors and authors of the 
Exponent, thereby emphasizing the strong feminist convictions of the Utah women). 
 6. See id. at 183-84 (explaining the Exponent’s dedication to the educational 
and professional advancement of women worldwide). 
 7. See id. (discussing the strong commitment of the Utah feminists to gender). 
 8. See id. at 184 (stating that the Exponent, through its publication of speeches 
from conferences outside of Utah, exposed Utah women to the national women’s 
movement). 
 9. See id. at 182-83 (“The Woman’s Exponent was as ready to expound the 
common grievances of women everywhere as to defend their own cause.”). 
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according to a prominent Exponent editor named Emmeline Wells, 
“[f]rom its first issue it was the champion of the suffrage cause . . . .”10 
In light of the Exponent’s devotion to progressive feminism in the 
late nineteenth century, it would be hard to overestimate the 
commitment of the women who produced the journal to the cause of 
empowering women everywhere or to the principle that women were 
as entitled to the pursuit of social independence, personal 
accomplishment, and political autonomy as men were.  Why, then, 
would so important an advocate for women’s (and human) rights as 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of the abolitionist classic Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, excoriate these same women for being complicit in “degrading 
bondage,” and for being party to “a cruel slavery whose chains have 
cut into the very hearts of thousands of our sisters.”?11  Why would the 
popular nineteenth-century American author Jennie Froiseth declare 
that these activist women were part of a community that supported 
the “degradation of woman,” a community that could “flourish only 
where [woman] is regarded and treated as a slave.”?12 
Stowe, Froiseth, and many others were harshly critical because the 
robust feminists who produced the Woman’s Exponent were 
Mormons, members of Joseph Smith’s controversial Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints—a religion best known for its practice of 
polygamy.13  Indeed, observers then and now have found it difficult to 
understand how these compelling advocates of women’s progress 
could simultaneously countenance or even engage in plural marriage, 
which would seem to have been inherently coercive, sexist, and 
                                                          
 10. See id. at 184. 
 11. See Harriet Beecher Stowe, Preface to T. B. H. STENHOUSE, TELL IT ALL: THE 
STORY OF A LIFE’S EXPERIENCE IN MORMONISM vi (HARTFORD, A.D. WORTHINGTON & CO., 
PUBLISHING 1875) (decrying and seeking the end of polygamy, which she described as 
a “cruel slavery” that “debases and degrades womanhood, motherhood, and the 
family”). 
 12. See Carrel Hilton Sheldon, Mormon Haters, in MORMON SISTERS: WOMEN IN 
EARLY UTAH 113, 120 (Claudia L. Bushman ed., Utah State Univ. Press 2d ed. 1997) 
(1976) (arguing that many in nineteenth-century America believed that Mormons 
degraded and enslaved women as part of their religious belief and practice) (quoting 
KIMBALL YOUNG, ISN’T ONE WIFE ENOUGH? 11 (1954)). 
 13. See RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY (2d. ed. 1989) 
(1986) (defining polygamy, or more precisely, polygyny, as the marriage of two or 
more women to one man).  Here I will use “polygamy” and “plural marriage” 
interchangeably in this conventional sense, denoting the marriage configuration of 
one man and more than one woman.  To be precise, though, the term “polygyny” 
defines the arrangement of one husband and plural wives, while “polyandry” means 
the converse—one woman and plural husbands.  American law has tended to 
complicate this terminology, generally using the term “bigamy” to refer to all plural 
marriage situations.  In American society, the generic term “polygamy,” while 
properly referring to any kind of plural marriage, has come to mean a marriage 
consisting of one husband and several wives, probably because that is how Mormons 
practiced plural marriage in the nineteenth century and how current Mormon 
fundamentalists practice it in the intermountain West. 
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unfair.14  This particular paradox, the dilemma of nineteenth-century 
Mormon women, is the initial focus of this article, as well as the point 
of access to a larger theme: the enduring paradox of community and 
autonomy—of the collective and the individual—in American society. 
Two principal terms of my analysis here, “community” and 
“autonomy,” are themselves rich with ambiguity, even paradoxical.  
Part of what makes the community-autonomy tension a genuine 
paradox, rather than merely an interesting dichotomy, is that there 
exists no clean practical line separating the two ideals; depending on 
one’s life circumstances, every human is, to some degree, 
simultaneously an autonomous individual (or at least lives by the 
necessary fiction of being a coherent self, capable of meaningful 
agency) and a member of various communities (family, ethnic, 
religious, professional, etc.), such that it matters a great deal how we 
characterize the balance struck between the two ideals in a given 
situation, and, more important still, how we assess that particular 
choice of balance. 
Mormon polygamy, what many nineteenth-century critics called the 
“Mormon Problem,” provides a truly distinct historical context in 
which to explore this ongoing tension in American law and culture 
between the ideals of community and autonomy.15  Its uniqueness 
notwithstanding, what the social phenomenon of Mormon polygamy 
produced in high relief was a variation on a quintessential American 
theme, played out in a clash of public narratives. Nineteenth-century 
Mormon women found themselves in an exquisitely difficult position 
morally, emotionally, and practically: whether and how to reconcile 
their religious faith, which included polygamy, with their political and 
social commitments to the progress of women.16  Put more broadly, 
these women experienced a deep conflict between community and 
autonomy, for their loyalty to religious community appeared 
incompatible with their loyalty to the progressive vision of advancing 
the rights and individual autonomy of American women, including 
their own.17 
                                                          
 14. See Dushku, supra note 1, at 177 (explaining how Mormon women were, and 
still are, misunderstood because of their conflicting loyalties to their faith and to the 
national women’s rights movement). 
 15. See Sheldon, supra note 12, at 113 (asserting that the “Mormon problem,” 
the question of polygamy, was the basis of most anti-Mormon sentiments). 
 16. See Dushku, supra note 1, at 177. 
 17. Id.  Of course, we might talk also of a “community” of progressive women and 
men far larger than the religious community of Mormons to which I refer.  By the 
same token, we might emphasize the individualistic, autonomy-oriented aspects of 
Mormonism, a nascent American religion that claimed First Amendment protection 
for the actions of its members—namely, plural marriage—undertaken in order to 
practice their religious beliefs.   This chicken-and-egg quality of the relationship 
between community and autonomy underscores the richness of the paradox. 
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The uniqueness of Mormon polygamy illuminates this classic 
paradox in instructive ways, especially as to issues of sexual politics, 
social identity, personal autonomy, and cultural legitimacy.18  The 
particular, concrete dilemmas that invariably issue from the paradox 
of community and autonomy are complex to begin with; their telling 
is more complicated still, and more consequential, because we come 
to know any particular social reality only by reading or hearing it as 
represented by other voices.19  This narrative mediation of things is 
thus an inevitable, necessary process that is both hermeneutic and 
epistemological.  Once we recognize this all-encompassing condition 
of the narrative textuality of discourse,20 we can look behind any 
particular narrative—behind someone’s distinct telling of things—to 
analyze the rhetorical strategies that produced the narrative in the 
first place: How are such dilemmas narrated on the public stage?  By 
whom?  For what purpose, and with what interests in mind?  With 
what imagery?  To what audience—and thus to what values—is this 
narrative meant to appeal? 
Understanding both the mediating influence of narratives and the 
importance of evaluating those narratives from a rhetorical standpoint 
is crucial to analyzing legal discourse in all of its operations—from 
legislators’ big picture debates about social values, to trial attorneys’ 
common sense courtroom narratives deployed to persuade juries, to 
judges’ precedent-minded policy rationales meant to justify court 
decisions (the dimension of legal discourse on which I will focus 
here), to law professors’ jurisprudential discussions in law journals.21  
At whatever level, legal discourse is, after all, the language of the law, 
whose purpose is to determine, establish, and legitimize the rules of 
human society.  As to Mormon polygamy, a seminal example of such 
discourse is the 1878 U.S. Supreme Court case of Reynolds v. United 
                                                          
 18. As I shall discuss in Part III, a remarkably similar cluster of community-
autonomy issues arises regarding the cultural and legal status of homosexuals in 
contemporary society, particularly on the question of same-sex marriage.  Indeed, the 
cultural and legal narratives that people use to portray gays and lesbians, and the 
social dynamics that attend those narratives, are rhetorically quite similar to the 
nineteenth-century clash of narratives over Mormon polygamy.  See, for example, 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000), for “anti-gay” narratives and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), for “pro-gay” narratives. 
 19. See, e.g., Roland Barthes, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of 
Narratives, in A BARTHES READER 251 (Susan Sontag ed., 1982) (describing the 
process of narration as continuous). 
 20. See generally Gregory C. Pingree, Afterward: Toward Stable Principles and 
Useful Hegemonies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 807 (2003) (exploring a more law-oriented 
notion of textuality and related issues). 
 21. See id. (suggesting that the variety of perspectives on the relationship between 
law and culture indicates “the search for a method—for a coherent framework in 
which to evaluate the conflicts and judgments of human society.”). 
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States.22 
In Reynolds, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal anti-
polygamy laws.23  In authoring the opinion, Chief Justice Morrisson 
Waite presented and justified the decision through a narrative 
championing the institution of conventional, monogamous marriage 
as the prime guarantor of social stability.24  As part of this justifying 
narrative,25 the High Court affirmed the trial court’s warnings about 
the dangers that polygamy posed to “pure-minded women and... 
innocent children,” “victims” who would “multiply and spread 
themselves over the land.”26  The Court’s determination that Mormon 
polygamy was “subversive of good order,”27 and thus not protected 
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, came at the 
expense of a particular group’s claim of religious freedom.  As such, 
Reynolds highlighted one important ground upon which the law 
tends to side with the community over the individual.  More precisely, 
                                                          
 22. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (limiting the scope of First 
Amendment protection of religious exercise in a landmark case in which the 
petitioner challenged a federal anti-polygamy statute). 
 23. See id. at 166 (holding that an anti-polygamy statute under the Court’s 
consideration was within the legislative power of Congress). 
 24. See id. at 166-67 (arguing that to allow a person to excuse their practices 
based on religious belief would make the religious doctrines superior to the law and 
would in effect “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself”). 
 25. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions 
exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning . . . .  Once 
understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not 
merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.”).  What I call 
here the Court’s “justifying narrative” is closely related to the more conventional 
concepts of the “judicial reasoning” or the “judicial rationale” of an opinion.  
However, by “narrative” I mean a more encompassing, less circumscribed idea of 
textuality than these conventional terms connote.  As I have discussed above, 
narrative, understood broadly, properly characterizes all purposeful discourse.  The 
judicial opinion is nothing if not purposeful in various important ways, from the 
purpose of maintaining or revising precedent to the purpose of legally, historically, 
and culturally justifying the position taken and the values espoused.  Much of this 
rhetorical activity is implicit, of course, but that does not diminish the reality that 
judicial opinions, like all texts, are complex narratives, themselves made of layers of 
other narratives.  The subject of narrative in legal discourse has been actively 
explored in legal scholarship for nearly two decades.  See generally James Boyd 
White, Judicial Opinion Writing: What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 
(1995), Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
2073 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An 
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Robert A. Burt, Symposium, 
Rethinking Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2005). 
 26. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167-68 (upholding the trial court’s decision by 
holding that the language used by the court to describe the evils of polygamy to the 
jury was not impassioned or prejudiced, but rather, a reasonable call to the 
sensibilities of the jurors). 
 27. See id. at 164 (outlining the history of the First Amendment and limiting the 
scope of the Free Exercise Clause when a religious practice threatens peace and order 
in a society). 
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the decision established a standard for privileging the more 
communal value of “good social order” over the more individualistic 
right of a particular community’s unconventional religious practice.28 
I have here introduced two kinds of public narrative—cultural and 
legal—by which Mormon polygamy was known in nineteenth-century 
America, and I have articulated the fundamental community-
autonomy paradox that those narratives serve to illuminate.  I will 
pursue this discussion further in three parts.  In Part I, I will briefly 
review fundamental aspects of Mormon history, particularly those 
related to the practice of plural marriage.  In Part II, I will selectively 
consider how nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy was represented 
on the public stage through both cultural and legal narratives.  I will 
analyze the rhetorical strategies at play in what became a nineteenth-
century narrative battle over the legitimacy of Mormon polygamy.  In 
Part III, I will suggest how this rhetorical approach to the American 
“telling” of Mormon polygamy—a study of narratives meant to 
legitimize or delegitimize a core aspect of cultural identity—might 
usefully be applied to a contemporary social controversy that 
underscores the paradox of community and autonomy: 
homosexuality and the so-called culture war over family values and the 
meaning of marriage. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF MORMON POLYGAMY 
The mark of religion is that it is the practice of an ultimate concern 
that orders all other concerns, an unconditioned loyalty that 
trumps all other loyalties. 
– Reinhold Niebuhr 
According to Mormon history,29 in 1820, Joseph Smith, fourteen 
                                                          
 28. See id. (concluding that polygamy was not a religious practice covered by the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 
480 U.S. 916 (1987) (holding that an individual’s religious beliefs do not excuse her 
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is 
free to regulate).  Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting 
religion “would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”  Id. 
 29. Many authors have published histories of the Mormons generally and of 
Mormon polygamy in particular.  A good general history written by Mormon 
historians is LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A 
HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS (Illini Books 1989) (1979).  A useful history of 
polygamy by a Mormon author is VAN WAGONER, supra note 13.  Probably the most 
widely respected general history of the Mormons is by a non-Mormon: JAN SHIPPS, 
MORMONISM: THE STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS TRADITION (1985).  Two especially 
erudite histories by non-Mormon authors come from the literary critic HAROLD 
BLOOM, THE AMERICAN RELIGION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE POST-CHRISTIAN NATION 
(1992), and the legal historian SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: 
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).  
Finally, for an excellent examination of the politics of Mormon polygamy in early 
twentieth-century America, see KATHLEEN FLAKE, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
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years old and part of a large, religiously diverse family in upstate New 
York, sought divine guidance regarding the many Christian sects 
competing for public attention during the Second Great 
Awakening.30  In response to his efforts, the boy was visited by God 
the Father, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit.31  God informed Joseph 
that none of the churches then existing had the full truth; that God 
intended to restore to Earth the true church as Christ had organized 
it two millennia earlier; and that he (Joseph Smith) would be the 
instrument of this restoration, the first prophet of modern times.32 
Over the next twenty-four years, Smith received various revelations 
about church organization and doctrine.  In 1830, he officially 
established The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints33 
(indicating that Christ’s original church was now restored), members 
of which were called “Mormons” by most people because of the Book 
of Mormon, which Smith had translated from ancient records.  The 
Mormons considered (and still consider) the revelations that Joseph 
Smith received, as well as the Book of Mormon and the Bible, to 
constitute their body of holy scripture.34 
The Mormons came to the Great Basin desert after suffering years 
of social and legal persecution in New York, Ohio, Missouri, and 
Illinois, culminating in the June 1844 assassination of Joseph Smith in 
Carthage, Missouri.35  General public hostility to the Mormons, at first 
                                                          
IDENTITY: THE SEATING OF SENATOR REED SMOOT, MORMON APOSTLE (2004). 
 30. See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra note 29, at 3-4 (characterizing the religious 
atmosphere in which Mormonism began as revivalist and diverse, leading to “more 
than a little religious squabbling”); see also SHIPPS, supra note 29, at 7 (stating the 
revivalist conditions in western New York “produced an atmosphere of 
experimentation that made it likely that novel religious ideas—which would have 
been dismissed out of hand in more settled situations—would here receive serious 
consideration.”). 
 31. See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra note 29, at 5 (depicting Smith as awed that 
God revealed himself to a “backwoods boy,” especially given his sense of failure and 
unworthiness growing up). 
 32. See SHIPPS, supra note 29, at 9 (stating that Smith was commanded not to join 
any existing denominations of Christianity because all were wrong). 
 33. Hence the common appellation “LDS,” which stands for “Latter-day Saints.”  
See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra note 29, at 21 (noting that the name, Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, “emphasized that this was Christ’s Church in the last 
days”). 
 34. See SHIPPS, supra note 29, at 26-27 (arguing that the publication and 
dissemination of the Book of Mormon was like any claim to truth: divisive.  To those 
who were convinced of the extraordinary nature of the book, “the Book of Mormon 
was precisely what it said it was: a translation of ancient records that had been written, 
sealed up, and hidden in the earth for more than fourteen centuries”); see also VAN 
WAGONER, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that the Book of Mormon established America 
as a chosen land that was “destined to receive the fullness of the everlasting gospel” 
and to become “the keystone of a new American religion”). 
 35. See GORDON, supra note 29, at 24-25  (reporting that the Mormon 
community’s increasing political and economic strength, combined with rumors of its 
sexual irregularities, aggressive proselytizing and unquestioning obedience to Smith, 
8
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a product of their cultish devotion to Smith, had increased 
significantly with the discovery, sometime during the late 1830s or 
early 1840s, that the church leader and some of his followers had 
commenced the practice of plural marriage.36 
After Smith’s martyrdom in 1844, the Mormons made the arduous 
journey westward under the leadership of Brigham Young.37  They 
settled in what is now the Salt Lake Valley in the summer of 1847, 
choosing this “largely uninhabited desert as the center place for the 
kingdom” so that they could “be left alone to freely establish a 
distinctive way of life that other communities had found so 
threatening and offensive.”38  Polygamy continued to be a central if 
not widespread39 part of this “distinctive way of life”; church members 
referred to plural marriage as “The Principle”; and the church 
officially acknowledged the practice as part of its doctrine in 1852.40 
Joseph Smith had boldly preached to his followers that polygamous 
marriage was “the most holy and important doctrine ever revealed to 
man on the earth,”41 a sacred tradition rooted in the Old Testament, 
                                                          
led to increasing harassment and ultimately to Smith’s murder). 
 36. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 13, at 7 (suggesting that speculations by both 
disaffected Mormons and non-Mormons that Mormon leaders were practicing 
polygamy exacerbated the anti-Mormon climate). 
 37. See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra note 29, at 96 (stating that Young and other 
Mormon leaders likened the Westward movement of the Mormons to the Exodus of 
Moses and the Israelites to Egypt, since they were similarly fleeing persecution in 
search of a Promised Land).  Like the Children of Israel, the Mormons were being 
tested by God to ensure that they were deserving of the Promised Land.  Id. 
 38. See Edwin B. Firmage, Religion & the Law: The Mormon Experience in the 
Nineteenth Century, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 771 (1965) (positing that the Mormons 
moved West in order to be free from religious persecution and to be free from 
disturbance in their quest for establishing Zion). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 775.  An expanded version of Firmage’s analysis is presented in 
the first legal history of the Mormon experience, E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, ZION IN 
THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
1830-1900 (1988).  See C. Peter Magrath, Chief Justice Waite and the “Twin Relic”: 
Reynolds v. United States, 18 VAND. L. REV. 507, 519 (1965) (arguing that although 
only a relatively small percentage of the Mormon community entered into plural 
marriage, polygamy became a central doctrinal, social, and later political, issue for 
Mormons in the nineteenth century); see also Firmage, supra note 38, at 775 
(suggesting that congressional persecution of polygamy in the late nineteenth 
century, which led to the conviction and imprisonment of Mormon males for 
polygamous relationships, was a tool by which to paralyze Mormon society, since the 
majority of the Mormon males engaging in polygamy were financially stable and 
morally worthy, and therefore were, by and large, leaders of the Mormon 
community). 
 40. See GORDON, supra note 38, at 23 (stating that “the principle” of plural 
marriage was “evidence of obedience to God’s law of celestial marriage and the hope 
of eternal progression through stages of heaven to eventual godhood”); see also, 
Firmage, supra note 38, at 771 (suggesting that the official acknowledgment of 
polygamy by the church resulted in polygamy becoming a national issue, leading to 
Congressional attempts to proscribe it). 
 41. James L. Clayton, The Supreme Court, Polygamy and the Enforcement of 
Morals in Nineteenth-Century America: An Analysis of Reynolds v. United States, 7 
9
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a practice central to the full restoration of Christ’s true church, and a 
solemn ritual that “sealed” a man to each of his wives for all eternity.42  
This theological justification for plural marriage, enabled by Smith’s 
invocations of both Old and New Testament doctrines, served to 
support the Mormons’ firmly held, officially published belief that 
polygamy, so integral a part of their exercise of religion in Christian 
America, surely would be protected by the “divinely inspired” U.S. 
Constitution.43  In the words of one Mormon publicist: 
The constitution and laws of the United States being founded upon 
the principles of freedom, do not interfere with marriage relations, 
but leave the nation free to believe in and practice the doctrine of a 
plurality of wives, or to confine themselves to the one wife system, 
just as they choose.44 
Despite the persecution that had driven them westward, the 
Mormons were confident that they could safely practice their religion 
in the Utah desert, where they could build and populate God’s 
kingdom.45 
American society, by and large, did not share this view.  Unlike the 
increasingly common present-day image of Mormons as honest, 
frugal, hard working, and prosperous (an image that most 
                                                          
DIALOGUE: A J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 46, 48, n.13 (1979) (citing a sworn statement 
made in 1874 by William Clayton, who had been private secretary to Joseph Smith 
and who had first transcribed Joseph Smith’s revelation on plural marriage); see also 
BLOOM, supra note 29, at 109 (stating that inherent in the institution of plural 
marriage was the belief that male nature was polygamous and that polygamy should 
be sanctified, not corrected). 
 42. See Clayton, supra note 41. 
 43. See, e.g., Noel B. Reynolds, The Doctrine of an Inspired Constitution, in “BY 
THE HANDS OF WISE MEN”: ESSAYS ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1, 1-28 (Ray C. Hillam 
ed., 1979) (theorizing that a basic Mormon belief is that the U.S. Constitution was 
divinely inspired).  This anthology, comprised of essays by Mormon scholars and 
church leaders, explores the basic, enduring Mormon belief in the inspired nature of 
the U.S. Constitution.  It seems ironic that late twentieth-century Mormons would 
extol the inspired status of a national Constitution that had effectively been used 
against them a century earlier.  On the other hand, orthodox Mormons would 
maintain that, as expressed both by church president John Taylor in 1879, infra note 
88, and by the contributors to the volume mentioned here, Mormons have always 
held great reverence for the U.S. Constitution, and that it is only the erroneous 
interpretation and application of that founding document to which they have 
objected at different moments in American history.  It complicates this issue further 
that the LDS Church has prohibited polygamy since the church officially ceased the 
practice in 1890.  As I shall discuss in Part II of this article, while today’s Mormon 
church conducts itself strictly by that 1890 policy, such a straightforward, diplomatic 
position on polygamy obscures a far more conflicted historical experience for the 
evolving nineteenth-century Mormon church during its roughly fifty-year polygamous 
period. 
 44. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 45-46; see also Clayton, supra note 41, at 49. 
 45. See Firmage, supra note 38, at 771 (observing that although the Mormons 
had hoped they could practice their unique faith without interruption, they were 
forced to deal with the federal government, which was “bent on eradicating Mormon 
distinctiveness”). 
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contemporary Mormons cultivate), many nineteenth-century 
Americans, like some today, perceived Mormons as a bizarre cult of 
religious fanatics who had rejected conventional Christianity to form 
an insular spiritual community based on an exclusive and ambitious 
theology.46  Mormons called themselves “Saints,” and non-believers, 
“Gentiles”;47 Mormons believed in modern-day revelations, visiting 
angels and golden plates, and the possibility of eventual godhood; 
and, most sensational of all, Mormons practiced polygamy.48 
II.  THE  NARRATIVE BATTLE OVER THE LEGITIMACY OF MORMON 
POLYGAMY 
No Western nation is as religion-soaked as ours, where nine out of 
ten of us love God and are loved by him in return.  That mutual 
passion centers our society and demands some understanding, if 
our doom-eager society is to be understood at all.49 
– Harold Bloom 
Before discussing examples of nineteenth-century narratives of 
Mormon polygamy, I think it important to establish the theoretical 
framework in which I will “read” those narratives.  This calls for a brief 
discussion of the critical concepts that inform my analysis—narrative, 
reading, textuality, and rhetoric.  I will define and illustrate my 
understanding of these and related ideas in Sections A and B, after 
which I will devote Sections C and D to analyzing cultural and legal 
narratives of polygamy in nineteenth-century America. 
A.  Narrative, Textuality, and “Fundamentalist” Versus “Literary” 
Reading 
The endless variety of definitions and uses of narrative—as a style, a 
trope, a theme, a discursive method—reflects the protean usefulness 
                                                          
 46. See generally Magrath, supra note 39, at 514 (arguing that the American 
public’s general perception that Mormons were cultish contributed to the 
persecution of Mormons). 
 47. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 38.  In both doctrine (i.e., as God’s chosen 
people) and experience (i.e., persecution and exodus), Mormons identify with the 
Israelites of the Old Testament.   Mormons still occasionally refer to themselves as 
“Saints,” though rarely to non-Mormons as “Gentiles,” which would seem consistent 
with the end of persecution and the general Mormon trend toward assimilation of 
mainstream American social and cultural norms over the last hundred years.  See 
generally Armand L. Mauss, Assimilation and Ambivalence: The Mormon Reaction to 
Americanization, 22 DIALOGUE: A J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 30 (1989); Martha S. 
Bradley, Changed Faces: The Official L.D.S. Position on Polygamy, 1890-1990, 14 
SUNSTONE: MORMON EXPERIENCE, SCHOLARSHIP, ISSUES, AND ART 26 (1990); How 
Mormons Cope with ‘Deterioration in Morals,’ U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 19, 
1977; GUSTIVE O. LARSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD (1971); 
Clayton, supra note 41, at 58; BLOOM, supra note 29, at 107, 256. 
 48. See, e.g., SHIPPS, supra note 29. 
 49. See BLOOM, supra note 29, at 20. 
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of narrative in human communication.50  The philosopher and 
literary critic Roland Barthes has argued that every reader of a given 
narrative or text is necessarily a reader of countless layers of 
overlapping narratives or texts, just as every reader is also a writer and 
re-writer, through reading, of consequent, related texts.51  In a 
seminal essay on the nature of narrative, Barthes articulates what 
Porter Abbott calls “[p]erhaps the fullest statement regarding the 
universality of narrative among humans”:52 
The narratives of the world are numberless.  Narrative is first and 
foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed 
amongst different substances—as though any material were fit to 
receive man’s stories.  Able to be carried by articulated language, 
spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the 
ordered mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in 
myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, 
comedy, mime, painting (think of Carpaccio’s Saint Ursula), 
stained-glass windows, cinema, comics, news items, conversation.  
Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is 
present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with 
the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a 
people without narrative.  All classes, all human groups, have their 
narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared by men with 
different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds.  Caring nothing for 
the division between good and bad literature, narrative is 
international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like 
life itself.53 
Although Barthes’ definition emphasizes the innumerable forms 
that narrative takes, his catalogue is by no means exhaustive.  For 
example, later I will argue that legal argument is also a form of 
narrative, just as narrative, conversely, is a form of argument, in that 
all narrative has a purpose and works according to its own internal 
logic.54 
                                                          
 50. See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, supra note 25, at 808 (discussing the merits of legal 
storytelling as a form of narrative and as a distinctive mode of legal scholarship). 
 51. See Barthes, supra note 19, at 251. 
 52. See H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 1 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (commenting that narrative is engaged in so often that 
it seems a natural part of our lives). 
 53. See Barthes, supra note 19, at 251-52 (stressing the importance of narrative 
and arguing for the need to develop models of the many different kinds of narrative). 
 54. See generally Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of 
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1419 (1995) (concluding that 
although a judge’s legal argument is constrained by external factors such as 
precedent and a commitment to the development of coherent law, a judge’s 
individual rhetorical skill, which includes the way a judge presents facts, describes 
rules and standards of review, handles precedent and decides whether to write 
separately or with colleagues, is still significant because it has a powerful influence on 
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Furthermore, the last two sentences of Barthes’ passage, beyond 
merely anatomizing narrative as a ubiquitous meta-genre, identify the 
intrinsic mediating process of narrative—narrative’s continuous role 
in literally constituting, as well as organizing, the context in which we 
interpret, understand, and represent our lived experience.55  Perhaps 
this is why the rhetorician Robert Scholes chooses to open Protocols 
of Reading, his discussion of reading as the quintessential human 
cognitive activity, with a pithy statement from Barthes much like that 
quoted above: “And no doubt that is what reading is: rewriting the 
text of the work within the text of our lives.”56  This lyrical, evocative 
epigraph about reading is itself a compact, implicit narrative (i.e., a 
narrative about narrative), for it contains at least several possible 
referents of a compelling story: “reading,” “rewriting,” “the text,” “the 
work,” “our lives.”57  To illustrate with a metaphor rooted in common 
                                                          
decision making). 
The law does not work by pure formal logic, of course.  Rather, analogical and 
syllogistic reasoning, when skillfully used, are valuable rhetorical tools, appealing to 
the legal reader on emotional, ethical, and rational levels and thus enabling 
persuasion.  Were the law purely logical, it would not differ from algebra; fact pattern 
X would always yield ruling Y—an ideal but not a reality in the American common law 
system, which is more precisely a highly structured rhetorical system.  Thus “logic” in 
the conventional sense is just one of many rhetorical tools used to persuade the legal 
reader of the validity of the argument being presented; the skillful legal writer might 
also invoke ideals such as consistency, objectivity, neutrality, precedent, tradition, and 
fairness.  Each of these tools or values contains its own narratives (e.g., “the law 
promises us fairness, so judges must square their decisions with some clear notion of 
what is fair”), and, conversely, the skillful deployment of one or several of these 
narratives makes a legal argument that is much more “logical” and thus persuasive to 
the legal reader.  For an excellent practical discussion of the rhetorical nature of 
judicial opinions, see Wald, supra note 54.  Judge Wald concludes her essay with a 
striking characterization of judges as rhetoricians, observing that within the structural 
constraints of the common law system, 
judges still use rhetoric to maneuver.  The way they present the facts, the way 
they describe rules and standards of review, the way they “handle” precedent, 
their decisions to write separately or stay with the pack, all provide wide 
avenues in which to drive the law forward.  A judge’s individual skill at 
working these levers of power, and doing so in a way that does not overly 
antagonize colleagues, continues to have a powerful influence on decision 
making.  That is why, in the end, judges—as well as their words—matter so 
much. 
Id. at 1419. 
The rhetorical realities of legal reasoning and discourse undermine the traditional 
assumption that law is about only reason and argument, not emotion.  For insightful 
interdisciplinary discussions of the complex relationship between reason and 
emotion, see THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 2000); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); PETER GOODRICH, 
LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 85-124 
(1987). 
 55. Barthes, supra note 19. 
 56. See ROBERT  E. SCHOLES, PROTOCOLS OF READING 10 (1989) [hereinafter 
SCHOLES, PROTOCOLS] (quoting Roland Barthes). 
 57. Id. 
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experience, Barthes’ tightly packed little statement is like an icon on a 
computer desktop, which, if mouse-clicked, will spring open to display 
its parts (“reading,” “rewriting,” etc.), which themselves may be 
clicked open to reveal multiple meanings, which might contain 
further elements, and so on. 
Were we to click open Barthes’ sentence and proceed as described 
above, we would produce an expanded version, a story that might go 
something like this: We are all readers, and we are always reading, 
however consciously.  This means that texts—let’s call the infinite 
universe of them “the textuality of things”—are always around us, 
inescapable, like water to fish.58  But that is only part of the equation, 
because each time we read a text, we bring our own hermeneutical 
machinery—reflecting our education, values, preferences, memories, 
experiences, beliefs, feelings, convictions, commitments, ideologies—
to bear, so that what was an “objective” external text is now our own 
unique version.59  Thus, we are authors (rewriters) at the same time 
(always) that we are readers; both inhere in the unending operation 
of reading.  This seamless cycle of reading-and-authoring is a simple 
yet profound way of explaining our interior experience of life and the 
world around us.60  But what is “the work”?  This seems the most 
ambiguous and challenging aspect of this little story.  Is “the work” 
something transcendent and mysterious, ever present and intuitively 
palpable, but never fully comprehensible, requiring our faith, like 
Joseph Campbell’s notion of that yearned-for source of immanence to 
which we give the name “God”?61  Or is “the work” a necessary, 
instrumental, interpretive metaphor, a provisional marker for all 
signs, which are always “floating” somewhat due to the unanchored 
nature of signification itself?  (Is this last understanding yet another 
way of saying that every reading is a rewriting?) 
I have “read” at some length Barthes’ single observation on reading 
and textuality because I want to demonstrate several crucial points of 
my definition of narrative, points that will serve as touchstones in the 
pages that follow.  It is worthwhile to discuss these points now, to 
establish more clearly what I mean by narrative and how I will use that 
definition. 
                                                          
 58. See id. at 1 (suggesting the world is a text—or an unending series of texts—
and therefore, the act of reading is inherent in human cognition). 
 59. See id. at 10 (“We make sense of our lives as we make sense of any text, by 
accommodating new instances to old structures of meaning and experience.”). 
 60. See id. at 10-11 (“Reading consists of bringing texts together.  It is a 
constructive activity, a kind of writing.”). 
 61. See, e.g., JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC DIMENSION: SELECTED ESSAYS 1959-
1987 156-79, 204-19 (Harper San Francisco 1997) (examining the influence of myth 
and symbolism in literature and culture). 
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First, narrative is a resident dimension of all texts—of textuality—
and is thus endemic to all human communication.62  As such, 
narrative functions to mediate how we understand and represent our 
experiences.  Abbott observes “the presence of narrative in almost all 
human discourse,” such that some theorists “place it next to language 
itself as the distinctive human trait.”63  Such theorists include Frederic 
Jameson, who has called narrative an “all-informing process” and “the 
central function or instance of the human mind,”64 and Jean-François 
Lyotard, who has described narrative as “the quintessential form of 
customary knowledge.”65  As these statements suggest, narrativity is at 
least roughly equivalent to textuality; we are always both inside and 
outside innumerable narratives, an epistemological state of affairs 
debated forcefully in literary and linguistic theory during the last 
several decades.66  Yet to acknowledge the inescapable mediating 
presence of narrative is not to relinquish the goal of some kind of 
meaningful, principled understanding of narrative.67 
                                                          
 62. See SCHOLES, PROTOCOLS, supra note 56 (examining what is reading and what 
it should be); ROBERT E. SCHOLES, THE CRAFTY READER (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) 
[hereinafter SCHOLES, CRAFTY] (demonstrating how to use certain rhetorical tools to 
become a crafty reader); ABBOTT, supra note 52 (anatomizing the fundamental 
aspects of narrative).  For probing discussions of the notion of textuality in relation to 
the law, see generally GOODRICH, supra note 54; STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL 
STUDIES 37-47, 436-502 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY]; 
STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING TOO 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1994) [hereinafter FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING]. 
 63. See ABBOTT, supra note 52, at 1. 
 64. See FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY 
SYMBOLIC ACT 13 (1981). 
 65. See JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON 
KNOWLEDGE 19 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minnesota Press 
1984) (1979). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
 67. In other words, just because language is “slippery” does not mean that we 
must give up hope of meaningful communication.  Rather, as readers, it behooves us 
to find interpretive methods and principles stable enough to provide traction as we 
navigate texts, especially given all of the intellectual log-rolling that characterizes 
postmodern thought.  And the law, perhaps more than any other discipline, relies on 
at least the necessary fiction that words and their meanings remain relatively stable if 
we adhere to principled, consistent forms of reading and interpretation.  Relativism is 
not synonymous with nihilism; what matters is the quality of our choice and 
application of principles by which to read and interpret texts.  For a discussion of 
these issues in a focused legal context, see generally Pingree, supra note 20, at 808 
n.3. 
A useful, concrete way to think about the rather ephemeral concepts of narrative and 
textuality is to consider the metaphorical quality of all language—metaphorical in the 
sense that, as an ongoing part of life, we come to understand unfamiliar concepts or 
things when they are explained to us in terms of concepts or things that are familiar 
to us.  My mention of “mouse-clicking” Barthes’ brief narrative to find its other 
meanings, and my equating people-and-textuality to fish-and-water, are two examples.  
Those metaphors are effective to the readers of this article to the extent that those 
readers know something about computers and fish—an assumption I feel safe in 
15
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In The Crafty Reader, Scholes presents a principled methodology 
of reading in a chapter called “Sacred Reading: A Fundamental 
Problem.”68  He situates his discussion in the context of contemporary 
religious and cultural debates among “fundamentalist” and “literary” 
readers.69  Scholes makes these two terms opposite ends of the 
“reading” spectrum and defines them in ways useful to my discussion 
here.  He defines “fundamentalist” readers as “literal” readers—
though the “concept of ‘literal meaning’ is itself an exaggeration, a 
metaphor, a paradox.  Nevertheless, [literal meaning] is an 
expression of the desire to get at the truth or meaning of a text.”70  
Scholes defines “literary” readers as those “attempting to situate the 
text and the writer of these letters in their own time, constructing, 
from the clues in the text, the persona of this writer, paying particular 
attention to [the author’s] self-fashioning.”71  Scholes advocates the 
ideal of “crafty” reading, a kind of “selective literalism” that takes 
seriously the desire of “fundamentalist” readers to get at the truth, 
while “resisting the [fundamentalist] zeal that often results in 
interpretive leaps to an unearned certainty of meaning.”72  Scholes 
resolves that “[t]he crafty reader must seek an authorial intention, 
while recognizing that there are many reasons why we shall never 
close the gap that separates us from the author.”73 
The philosopher Richard Rorty praises such “literary” reading by 
suggesting that it enables us to participate in creating, rather than 
merely inheriting, the narratives of ourselves and our lives.74  In an 
essay called “The Contingency of Selfhood,” Rorty invokes Nietzsche’s 
thinking about the creation of self as a way to describe, quite 
poetically, a process of self-substantiation through narrative: 
In [Nietzsche’s] view, in achieving . . . self-knowledge we are not 
coming to know a truth which was out there (or in here) all the 
time.  Rather, he saw self-knowledge as self-creation.  The process of 
                                                          
making.  Hence the essence of metaphor is to communicate one thing in terms of 
something else—which, if one thinks about it, is the central cognitive process at work 
in any communication, however pedestrian.  For an excellent, common sense 
discussion of the metaphorical nature of language, see generally GEORGE LAKOFF &  
MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). 
 68. See SCHOLES, CRAFTY supra note 62, at 212-39. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 238. 
 72. See id. at 219. 
 73. See id. at 230. 
 74. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 27-28 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1989) (discussing how creating “one’s mind is to create one’s own 
language, rather than to let the length of one’s mind be set by the language other 
human beings have left behind.”). 
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coming to know oneself, confronting one’s contingency, tracking 
one’s causes home, is identical with the process of inventing a new 
language—that is, of thinking up some new metaphors.  For any 
literal description of one’s individuality, which is to say any use of 
an inherited language-game for this purpose, will necessarily fail.  
One will not have traced that idiosyncrasy home but will merely 
have managed to see it as not idiosyncratic after all, as a specimen 
reiterating a type, a copy or replica of something which has already 
been identified.  To fail as a poet—and thus, for Nietzsche, to fail as 
a human being—is to accept somebody else’s description of oneself, 
to execute a previously prepared program, to write, at most, elegant 
variations on previously written poems.75 
While using a somewhat different set of terms, Rorty, like Scholes, is 
concerned with how we respond to the mediating narratives of our 
lives—literally, the inherited words, concepts, paradigms, histories, 
and ideologies that constitute the thinking-and-expressing medium of 
our experience.  Rorty asserts that although none of us chooses the 
“hand we are dealt,” our formative community or communities, each 
of us nonetheless has the agency and power to determine how to “play 
our hand” in original ways—how to achieve a meaningful degree of 
personal autonomy.76  Indeed, Rorty contends that, in confronting 
the contingent forms of our own construction and ongoing 
mediation, we may achieve even more than a meaningful kind of self-
realization, an “owned” if inherited subjectivity; we may move toward 
genuine autonomy by actually undoing the inherited architecture of 
our subjectivity and rebuilding ourselves through narrative.77  As he 
puts it, “the only way to trace home the causes of one’s being as one is 
would be to tell a story about one’s causes in a new language.”78 
As if taking her cue from Scholes and Rorty, the philosopher Honi 
Fern Haber characterizes this “literary” perspective on narrativity as a 
kind of enlightened compromise, a critical antidote to the kinds of 
dangerously “fundamentalist” narratives that I will discuss later in this 
article: 
There is no view from nowhere.  We can never leave all our 
prejudices behind and operate from a wholly disinterested 
standpoint, but our prejudices become dangerous only when they 
are dogmatic, kept hidden from view and not open to discussion....  
We cannot think or speak, much less act, in any purposeful manner 
without having structured our world and our interests in some 
heuristically useful way.  Without some notion of structure (unity) 
                                                          
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 28-29. 
 77. See id. at 28. 
 78. See id. 
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and some allowance for a legitimate recognition of similarities 
between ourselves and others, there can be no subject, community, 
language, culture.79 
In her distinct terms, Haber here engages two critical aspects of 
narrative and their implications for a core subject of this article, the 
paradox of autonomy and community: the impossibility of standing 
outside narrative textuality; the imperative of remaining mindful that 
rhetorical strategies of narrative, neutral in the abstract, will carry 
moral implications and political consequences when deployed in the 
service of living narrative; and the need to recognize our common 
values in order to reason together to navigate our differences as 
autonomous individuals.  Indeed, when we recognize the impossibility 
of neutral narration, rather than undermine the credibility of the 
process or of ourselves as narrators, we actually free our readers to 
consider more realistic, meaningful avenues of evaluation.  In contrast 
to the “literary” methodologies of Scholes, Rorty, and Haber, of 
course, is the more common human tendency toward 
“fundamentalist” narrative, which often produces a problem I will call 
“rhetorical reductivism.” 
B.  The Fundamentalist Problem of Rhetorical Reductivism 
During the 1860 Congressional debate about Mormon polygamy, 
Congressman McClernand of Illinois laid down this warning: 
As to polygamy, I charge it to be a crying evil; sapping not only the 
physical constitutions of the people practicing it, dwarfing their 
physical proportions and emasculating their energies, but at the 
same time perverting the social virtues, and vitiating the morals of 
its victims....  It is a scarlet whore.  It is a reproach to the Christian 
civilization; and deserves to be blotted out.80 
Although this kind of righteous rhetoric was not uncommon in 
nineteenth-century America generally, it appears to have been 
especially typical of public feeling toward Mormons and their plural 
marriages.81  For example, around the time of Congressman 
McClernand’s thunderous pronouncement, professor Frances Lieber, 
a leading figure in the development of American political science, 
denounced Mormonism as a “repulsive fraud” and a “wicked idea”;82 
                                                          
 79. See HONI FERN HABER, BEYOND POSTMODERN POLITICS: LYOTARD, RORTY, 
FOUCAULT 5 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 80. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1514 (1860) (statement of Rep. 
McClernand). 
 81. See Magrath, supra note 39, at 514-20 (discussing the history of American 
attitudes towards Mormons). 
 82. See id. at 514 (citing FRANCES LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 
320 (Lippincott 1859) (1853) (showing that most Americans did not understand the 
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not long thereafter, a prominent clergyman in Chicago declared that 
“Mormonism ought to be dynamited”;83 and elsewhere, social 
commentators popularized the idea that the Mormon Church was a 
“society for the seduction of young virgins.”84  One critic announced 
that Salt Lake City was “the biggest whorehouse in the world.”85 
The Mormons did not accept these public verdicts quietly.  In 
October 1879, after Congress had acted to outlaw polygamy86 and the 
Supreme Court had upheld that law and ruled that the First 
Amendment did not protect plural marriage as an exercise of 
religion,87 Mormon Church President John Taylor aired this response 
in the Church’s general conference: 
We might ask—will they derive any benefit from any course taken 
against the Latter-day Saints?  No!  A thousand times no!!  I tell you 
that the hand of God will be upon them for it . . . .  We do not want 
them to force upon us their drinking saloons, their drunkenness, 
their gambling, their debauchery and lasciviousness.  We do not 
want these adjuncts of civilization.88 
Just as Congressman McClernand’s moralistic diatribe against 
Mormon polygamy was typical of contemporary public discourse on 
the issue, so President Taylor’s indignant and equally pious rebuke 
was characteristic of the Mormons’ style of return volley.89 
Indeed, the Mormons, already wary of the federal government 
because of past conflict, had become increasingly antagonistic after 
Congress acted to proscribe polygamy in 1862.90  Subsequently, 
Mormon spokesmen frequently portrayed the “non-Mormon world . . 
. as wicked, adulterous and corrupt.  Church members began to 
describe monogamy pejoratively as ‘the one-wife-system’ or ‘serial 
marriage’ . . . .”91  John Taylor represented this increasingly strident 
                                                          
“strange cult” of Mormonism). 
 83. See id. (citing RAY B. WEST, JR., KINGDOM OF THE SAINTS 322 (1957)). 
 84. See id. at 515 (explaining that the Mormons resented the charge that they 
practiced polygamy for purposes of carnal pleasure). 
 85. See id. at 515 n.41 (“A popular biography of Ann Eliza Young, the stormy and 
apostate twenty-seventh wife of Brigham Young”) (citing IRVING WALLACE, THE 
TWENTY-SEVENTH WIFE 15 (Simon & Schuster 1961). 
 86. See The Morrill Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 
1910). 
 87. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (holding that to 
allow a “religious practice” to justify breaking of a law would be to acknowledge such 
a religion as superior to the law of the land). 
 88. See John Taylor, The Work of God Cannot be Hindered—The United States 
to be Afflicted by Judgment, 20 J. OF DISCOURSES 316, 320-21 (1880). 
 89. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (showing responses by John 
Taylor to the actions of politicians). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Clayton, supra note 41, at 48. 
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outlook when, in the same 1879 sermon, and without a trace of irony, 
he claimed that working within the federal government were 
“religious fanatics and corrupt politicians” who “would not hesitate to 
sweep us off the face of the earth to get elected.”92  Then, appealing 
to the basic Mormon reverence for the Constitution,93 Taylor 
concluded that these politicians “care nothing about human rights, 
liberty, or life, if they can bring about the results desired.”94 
Public statements concerning Mormon polygamy abounded in 
nineteenth-century America.  What stands out about them—indeed, 
what they nearly always shared, regardless of their source—was a 
zealous, polarized quality, an unyielding insistence on the exclusive 
moral rightness of their position.95  Such stark representations of 
polygamy might seem inconsonant to anyone familiar with the 
convoluted history of plural marriage in America; since its inception 
with the Mormons in the nineteenth century, the American practice 
of polygamy has been, for those who have lived it as for those who 
have studied it, nothing if not a complex matter.  This was perhaps 
especially true for nineteenth-century Mormons, for whom polygamy, 
while a galvanizing, purportedly spiritual way of life, was also 
confusing, traumatic, and divisive.96 
                                                          
 92. See Taylor, supra note 88, at 320 (criticizing the selfish nature of those 
politicians). 
 93. See generally Reynolds, supra note 43 (exploring the basic Mormon belief in 
the inspired nature of the U.S. Constitution). 
 94. See Taylor, supra note 88, at 320. 
 95. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1514 (1860) (statement of Rep. 
McClernand) (judging the Mormon church as an irreverent institution with no 
respect for laws or morals); LIEBER, supra note 82, at 320; WEST, supra note 83, at 322. 
 96. Accounts of life in Mormon polygamy range from the autobiographical to the 
fictional to the scholarly, and from the apologist to the excoriating to the satirical.  
See, e.g., Martha Sonntag Bradley & Mary Brown Firmage Woodward, Plurality, 
Patriarchy, and the Priestess: Zina D.H. Young’s Nauvoo Marriages, 20 J. OF MORMON 
HIST. 84 (1994); JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE PRINCIPLE 
(Univ. of Utah Press 1987); Kahlile Mehr, Women’s Response to Plural Marriage, 18 
DIALOGUE: A J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 84 (1985); LINDA KING NEWELL & VALEEN 
TIPPETTS AVERY, MORMON ENIGMA:  EMMA HALE SMITH (1984); Julie Dunfey, “Living the 
Principle” of Plural Marriage: Mormon Women, Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the 
Nineteenth Century, 10 FEM. STUD. 523 (1984); ORSON SCOTT CARD, A WOMAN OF 
DESTINY (1984).  See generally Stephanie Smith Goodson, Plural Wives, in MORMON 
SISTERS: WOMEN IN EARLY UTAH (Claudia L. Bushman ed., Utah State Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1997) (1976); Dushku, supra note 1; Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Fictional Sisters; 
MAURINE WHIPPLE, THE GIANT JOSHUA (Western Epics 1976) (1941); SAMUEL WOOLLEY 
TAYLOR, FAMILY KINGDOM (Western Epics 1974) [hereinafter TAYLOR, FAMILY 
KINGDOM]; SAMUEL WOOLLEY TAYLOR, I HAVE SIX WIVES: A TRUE STORY OF PRESENT-DAY 
PLURAL MARRIAGE (1956) [hereinafter TAYLOR, I HAVE SIX WIVES]; PAUL BAILEY, 
POLYGAMY WAS BETTER THAN MONOTONY (Westernlore Press 1972); T.B.H. 
STENHOUSE, EXPOSE OF POLYGAMY IN UTAH: A LADY’S LIFE AMONG THE MORMONS 
(1872); JENNIE ANDERSON FROISETH, THE WOMEN OF MORMONISM;  OR, THE STORY OF 
POLYGAMY AS TOLD BY THE VICTIMS THEMSELVES (C.G.G. Paine 1887) (1882); JENNIE 
BARTLETT SWITZER, ELDER NORTHFIELD’S HOME; OR SACRIFICED ON THE MORMON ALTAR 
(New York, J. Howard Brown Co. 1882); ANN ELIZA YOUNG, WIFE NO. 19 (Hartford, 
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The experiential complexity of polygamy97 is precisely what I will 
emphasize in this section, contrasting the recorded reality of this 
unwieldy social phenomenon with the moralistic, simplifying 
perspectives that fueled a fierce narrative battle between the 
Mormons, on the one hand, and the U.S. government and much of 
the American public, on the other.  In this narrative battle, each side 
tended to present argument-narratives of the other that invoked 
grand ideologies and thus obscured the nuanced reality of the 
polygamy experience, further polarizing the public debate by 
narrowing the scope of possible meanings about life in polygamy.98 
In particular, I want to consider the social and cultural implications 
of this kind of narrative process, in which each side sought legitimacy 
for its vision of American religious identity by representing polygamy 
in morally simplistic terms and images for purposes of gaining ethical 
leverage in the ongoing public dialectic.99  How, and why, did this 
sort of fundamentalist narrative process—an exemplar of rhetorical 
reductivism—succeed in producing the predominant American moral 
narrative about polygamy? 
Of course, all representations—all narratives—inevitably reduce 
their subject matter in the sense that narratives must impose some 
kind of order on the unruliness of experience, with language always 
an approximation of what is intended.100  Thus in discussing of the 
kind of narrative produced by rhetorical reductivism, I am talking 
about a matter of degree.  Still, because this kind of overweening, two-
dimensional narrative tends to be common and influential as an 
element of public discourse, I think it worth examining as part of my 
analysis of narrative and its role in establishing cultural legitimacy.  
Why did partisans in the public debate over polygamy depict so 
complex a cultural and religious phenomenon in such singular, 
                                                          
Dustin, Gilman & Co. 1875); MARIA WARD, FEMALE LIFE AMONG THE MORMONS: A 
NARRATIVE OF MANY YEARS’ PERSONAL EXPERIENCE (New York, J.C. Derby 1855). 
 97. See, e.g., Big Love, HBO Series, premiere episode, Mar. 12, 2006 (exploring 
the complex family relationships and ambivalent personal feelings characteristic of 
modern-day polygamous families). 
 98. Compare Taylor, supra note 88 (stressing that the rejection of Mormon 
polygamy was rooted in general prejudice against the Mormons and not in any 
genuine concern for morality), with CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1514 (1860) 
(statement of Rep. McClernand) (contending that the Mormons did not have respect 
for U.S. laws and that they were immoral). 
 99. See Taylor, supra note 88. 
 100. This does not contradict the notion of the pervasiveness of textuality; to be 
inescapably inside the medium of language does not preclude the equally 
inescapable, ongoing necessity of forging, for external (e.g., social, political, legal, 
cultural) purposes, meaningful communication within that medium—something like 
the need to continually repair and orient one’s sailboat while sailing in various 
weather conditions. 
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imperious moral terms?  How did the innumerable authors of these 
dueling narratives, all invoking, to some degree, the institutional 
voices of God and state, effectively divest the experience of polygamy 
of any moral ambiguity?  More generally, how might we explain the 
collective impulse to deploy rhetorical reductivism in representing 
socially divisive issues so as to maintain an established moral order, 
often at the cost of intellectual integrity? 
Of course, unyielding language such as that used by Congressman 
McClernand or church President Taylor often has characterized 
public, official, and institutional representations of nettlesome social 
issues in American life.  In fact, once we account for a century’s worth 
of linguistic shift, we might find it difficult to distinguish the bellicose 
statements I have quoted from the holy rhetoric we are served today 
on controversial public issues—abortion, drugs, pornography, 
affirmative action, and homosexuality, to name a few.  But often such 
grandiose language is, to risk an oxymoron, grandly reductive, 
invoking sweeping authority to preempt doubt or, to conceal conflict 
or disagreement.  In these ways rhetorical reductivism prevents 
meaningful public discussion, for it blinds us to the ethical and 
experiential complexity of a social practice like polygamy.  Still, we 
should not be surprised that such binary rhetoric is used to convey 
public accounts of controversial social issues; perhaps just this kind of 
simplification is necessary to repress or otherwise manage—to order 
in an acceptable way—the public and personal anxiety that attends 
controversial issues.  Indeed, I would suggest that righteous, simplistic 
public responses to controversial issues are tokens of anxiety, signs of 
an underlying ambivalence that emerges when we are forced to 
consider difficult questions about who we are, individually and 
collectively.101 
                                                          
 101. Regarding the markedly divisive effects (including the rhetorical reductivism I 
posit here) that certain matters of social controversy tend to produce, sociologist 
Jerome Skolnick offers a useful theory of how people process controversial social 
issues.  See Jerome H. Skolnick, The Social Transformation of Vice, 51 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1988).  Skolnick has long studied behavior that mainstream 
society views as “vice”—gambling, drugs, adultery, and prostitution, for example.  Id. 
at 10.  He suggests that public controversy about such issues stems from our moral 
ambivalence towards them, so that vice is not merely or exclusively “evil or immoral” 
behavior, but rather conduct that connotes “pleasure and popularity, as well as 
wickedness.”  Id.  Hence the claim about moral ambivalence, for vice “is conduct that 
a person may enjoy and deplore at the same time.”  Id.  This theory of vice offers 
interesting possibilities for our analysis of narratives about the Mormon polygamy 
controversy. 
For example, given that Mormon polygamy was genuinely controversial in 
nineteenth-century America, we may read rhetorically reductive responses to 
polygamy as a possible indication of dividedness and uncertainty, not only within 
those who criticized polygamy, but also within those who engaged in it.  Indeed, this 
view of social behavior enables us meaningfully to critique what we might think of as a 
whole dialectic of vice about Mormon polygamy—that is, engagement by someone in 
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C.  Cultural Narratives of Mormon Polygamy 
Polygamy was repugnant to mainstream nineteenth-century 
American values regarding the configuration and politics of 
marriage,102 and public response was fierce.  In 1856, for instance, the 
first Republican Party platform proclaimed “both the right and the 
imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin 
relics of barbarism—Polygamy and Slavery.”103  This statement 
reflected the common fear that polygamy, like slavery, would spread 
to the territories.104  Polygamy had spread to the Utah territory, of 
course, but perhaps more interesting for our purposes here is that 
some Americans linked the narrative of polygamy with that of slavery, 
equating the ostensibly consensual practice of the former with the 
undeniably coercive practice of the latter.  Novelist and social activist 
Harriet Beecher Stowe spoke for many who viewed plural marriage as 
anything but consensual; polygamy was merely a different kind of 
“degrading bondage, . . . a cruel slavery whose chains have cut into 
                                                          
the practice of polygamy, public reactions against that engagement, counter-response 
and justification, and so on.  In a sense, this broad, open-ended notion of vice helps 
us address the very problem at issue here—simplistic, two-dimensional analysis—as we 
work to understand the meaning of reductive representations of social controversy, 
for it allows us to view mainstream definitions of vice, not merely as straightforward 
(i.e., literal-fundamentalist) statements of political affiliation or identity, but also, in 
Skolnick’s term, as a sign of deeper “cultural contradiction.”  Id. at 11. 
This may seem just an academic version of self-fulfilling clichés like “me thinks thou 
dost protest too strongly,” or “homophobia conceals a latent homosexual desire.”  Yet 
it seems indisputable that these worn maxims carry a kernel of truth about why 
people tend to feel unusually strongly about certain issues.  How else to explain a 
fierce attack on a relatively unknown other, unless we at least recognize that the 
speaker gives a damn one way or another?  Polygamy mattered, for good or ill, to 
those who engaged so extensively in excoriating or exalting it, and the evidence is in 
the telling. 
Skolnick’s theory is also helpful to us if we want to understand the dynamic 
relationship between culture and vice —between what is publicly represented and 
what is personally felt and experienced—because the theory gives us one principled 
way to read narratives about polygamy in more of a literary, rather than a literal-
fundamentalist, mode.  That is, Skolnick’s interest in searching for signs of “cultural 
contradiction” is precisely to emphasize the possible ambiguity of the subtext—to 
look beyond cleanly drawn lines of simplistic moral representation to the underlying 
complexity of a controversial social practice and its intricate relations to history, 
circumstance, ideology and will. 
 102. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 253-60 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1992) (suggesting that polygamy threatened the ideal of “companionate” marriage 
that anchors western notions of monogamy). 
 103. See KIRK HAROLD PORTER & DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY 
PLATFORMS, 1840-1960 27 (Univ. of Illinois Press 2d ed. 1961) (noting that this hard 
line on polygamy appeared again in the Party’s 1876 platform, and that in 1880 the 
Republicans called for the elimination of polygamy and, if necessary, the militarily 
enforced separation of “the political power from the ecclesiastical power of the so-
called Mormon church.”). 
 104. Id. 
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the very hearts of thousands of our sisters.”105  And Jennie Froiseth, 
the well known author of The Women of Mormonism, or the Story of 
Polygamy as Told by the Victims Themselves, declared that “[t]he 
cornerstone of  polygamy is the degradation of woman, and it can 
flourish only where she is regarded and treated as a slave.”106 
In the face of this harsh public narrative of Mormon polygamy as 
women’s serfdom, the church dug in its heels, repeating its 
institutional narrative about the role of women through a series of 
official statements that did nothing to refute the public impression 
that Mormon wives, polygamous or otherwise, lived in servitude to 
their husbands.107  On the contrary, the church seemed bent on 
reinforcing the general Victorian narrative of women as subject to 
male authority.108  For example, in 1852, at the behest of Brigham 
Young, Church Apostle Orson Pratt prepared “Celestial Marriage,” a 
lengthy defense of polygamy that coincided with the church’s 1852 
public announcement of plural marriage.  Pratt, probably the 
church’s chief apologist for polygamy, characterized the woman’s 
place in the family in distinctly Pauline terms: 
The husband is the head of the family, and it is his duty to govern 
his wife or wives, and the children, according to the laws of 
righteousness; and it is the duty of the wife to be subject unto him 
in all things, even as the church is subject unto Christ.109 
Patriarchal pronouncements that echoed the familiar New 
Testament metaphor of Christ’s church as a “body” seem to have been 
an attempt at theological justification of polygamy through the 
invocation of a well-known, orthodox Christian image—one in which 
patriarchal order was unobjectionable. 
Yet the Mormons’ expansion of the well-known narrative of Christ’s 
church “body” to include polygamy offended mainstream Christians, 
much as, in principle, the attempt to include same-sex unions within 
the grand narrative of traditional marriage would offend many 
Americans more than a century later.  Indeed, the Mormons’ revised 
narrative of the patriarchal family order undoubtedly contributed to 
the popular notion that Mormons, regardless of their theological 
                                                          
 105. See STENHOUSE, TELL IT ALL, supra note 11, at v (asking every woman who 
reads the story in the book to give all they can to the effort to free women from the 
bondage of polygamy). 
 106. See Sheldon, supra note 12, at 121 (quoting YOUNG, supra note 12, at 11) 
(explaining that polygamy was a sensitive topic during a time when issues of women’s 
rights and equality were coming to the forefront of national discussion). 
 107. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 88, at 320-21 (calling monogamy a social evil, and 
urging Mormon women to eschew non-Mormons who criticized polygamy). 
 108. See, e.g., Magrath, supra note 39, at 518 (quoting YOUNG, supra note 12, at 
50). 
 109. See id. 
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justifications, had constructed their polygamous system to imitate “the 
Oriental concubines, in which the women were near-slaves.”110  
Clearly, the public embrace of Paul’s “body of Christ” narrative did 
not also yield acceptance of the radical departure from convention 
that polygamy represented.111  Joseph Singer has observed that the 
persuasion process turns on whether the speaker succeeds in 
compelling the audience to recognize or discover common ground 
(e.g., shared values) with a person or position that the audience 
initially does not support.112  This conception of persuasion has its 
limits, however: the nineteenth-century American public’s “discovery” 
or “recognition” of values already held about marriage decidedly did 
not lead many to accept the argument, implicit in the Mormons’ 
narrative of Christ’s body, that a significant deviation from monogamy 
was legitimate, even if rooted in selective Old Testament 
precedent.113 
This particular clash of narratives is worth considering a little 
further, as it raises an important point about cultural legitimacy.  
Generally speaking, the nineteenth-century American public read 
Mormon polygamy within a narrative of slavery; that is, people 
generally were persuaded that Mormon plural marriage fettered and 
devalued women in ways sufficiently analogous to how slavery fettered 
and devalued black Americans that the slavery narrative should 
include polygamy as well as the southern institution of owning and 
using black people as property.114  The Mormons, on the other hand, 
read their practice of polygamy as divinely inspired, part of several 
otherwise legitimate nineteenth-century American narratives: the 
narrative of reverence for the prophets of the Old Testament, some of 
whom had had plural wives; the narrative of devotion to the Apostle 
Paul’s patriarchal New Testament teachings that made women 
subservient to men; and the narrative that the Constitution, divinely 
inspired, protected distinct religious practices like polygamy—
                                                          
 110. See id. (indicating that most Americans saw Mormon polygamy as being in 
fundamental conflict with American culture and as an imitation of an oriental system 
of female slavery). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442 (1989) 
(exploring the difference between what works and what ought to work in 
persuasion); see also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
971, 1002-04 (1991) (describing how through certain narrative techniques the 
author, as a reader, felt compassion for people whose experiences were completely 
different from hers). 
 113. See, e.g., Magrath, supra note 39, at 518 (explaining how mainstream 
Americans viewed polygamy as a practice arising from oriental slavery, rather than 
one rooted in Judeo-Christian religious history). 
 114. See id. 
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practices that were themselves inspired by God.115 
Importantly, each narrative served to legitimize the cultural identity 
of its proponents, which in this situation amounted to being obedient 
to the expressed doctrines of the Christian God, and thus legitimate 
in the eyes of that God.  Such a starkly binary clash of narratives, often 
both the source and the product of rhetorical reductivism, meant a 
zero sum game as to legitimacy in the eyes of one or the other 
audience (Mormon or American public).  That is, narrative that seeks 
to legitimize the cultural identity—and thus the worldview—of the 
speaker often serves, just as effectively, to de-legitimize the cultural 
identity of the “other” in the narrative battle.116  This should not be 
surprising; these binary functions are typically inseparable, flip sides 
of the same coin: a narrative that undermines the cultural legitimacy 
of a certain person or group will almost certainly have the effect, 
whether intended by a specific author or communicated as a more 
diffuse cultural sensibility, of legitimizing the position of the author. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of “zero sum” legitimacy will 
operate roughly to the extent that the narratives in conflict are literal-
fundamentalist, binary narratives, leaving little room for hermeneutic 
negotiation.  And although this need not be the case when narratives 
clash, it seems that the greater the perceived religious stakes, the 
greater the human tendency to batten down the rhetorical hatches to 
ensure a sense of certainty and legitimacy, even if (or, in Scholes’ 
view, especially if)117 that rhetorical strategy expresses itself in the 
cloak of highly figurative language. 
Some Mormon plural wives would likely have disputed categorical 
characterizations of their polygamous lifestyle, for most of their first-
hand accounts suggest that the experience of polygamy was 
heterogeneous.118  Historian Kahlile Mehr concludes his detailed 
survey of such women’s personal narratives with this observation: 
Plural marriage was a complex phenomenon in both theology and 
practice.  It was no less complex psychologically.  Some LDS women 
ardently accepted it as a divine principle.  Others viewed it as an 
                                                          
 115. See generally Taylor, supra note 88 (illustrating a typical Mormon response to 
attacks on the practice of polygamy and the official Mormon assertion that polygamy 
was rooted legitimately in religion). 
 116. See generally Singer, supra note 112 (arguing that finding common ground 
or shared values is the key to effective persuasion). 
 117. See SCHOLES, CRAFTY, supra note 62, at 231 (observing that “fundamentalist 
reading is always marked by shifts from the literal to the figurative—as a way of 
concealing conflicts”). 
 118. See, e.g., Goodson, supra note 96, at 95-99; Dushku, supra note 1, at 177-97; 
Bradley & Woodward, supra note 96, at 111-18; BAILEY, supra note 96, at 33-37; Mehr, 
supra note 96, at 84-88.  See generally WHIPPLE, supra note 96; NEWELL & AVERY, supra 
note 96. 
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unwelcome but necessary sacrifice to achieve salvation.  A few 
loathed it.  There were women who coaxed reluctant husbands to 
take an additional wife.  Others quietly acquiesced—either in initial 
discussions or when presented with a fait accompli, and still others 
left the household rather than accept a sister wife.  Sometimes the 
inner and outer persons were in conflict.  Inwardly repelled and 
outwardly obedient, many women faced a struggle that for some led 
to triumphant self-control and for others to shattering 
disillusionment.119 
Notwithstanding the rhetorical reductivism at work in most public 
narratives about polygamy, then, the experience itself, like any 
experience involving intimate social relationships, did not lend itself 
to transparent or uniform interpretation at either a personal or a 
symbolic level.120 
Still, many Americans derived their impression of Mormon 
polygamy almost exclusively from nightmarish personal narratives 
published in popular books like Jennie Bartlett’s Elder Northfield’s 
Home; or Sacrificed on the Mormon Altar, A Story of the Blighting 
Curse of Polygamy.121  The New York Times also contributed 
significantly to this national impression, consistently inveighing 
against Mormons and polygamy.  In 1882, for example, after The 
World had published a benign report on the Mormons, the Times 
reprinted the article, followed by the demand, “What can [the 
editor’s] object be in making his paper the apologist for a false and 
degrading religion?”122  According to The New York Times, the editor 
of The World must have been angling to provide himself “with as 
many wives as he now holds shares of stock.”123  A year later, after 
many Protestant churches had organized mass meetings in most large 
American cities to draft resolutions urging Congress to take further 
action against the Mormons, The New York Times’ editorial page 
seemed to relish the chance to point a finger at the Mormons, calling 
them “a class of sinners . . . providentially supplied for the purpose of 
enabling eloquent ministers to preach powerful sermons without 
offending any possible pew-holder.”124 
Editorial page hyperbole aside, it says much about public sentiment 
that The New York Times, arguably the national journalistic voice of 
record, felt confident speaking for “any possible pew-holder” in 
                                                          
 119. See Mehr, supra note 96, at 84. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 117, nn. 14 & 121. 
 122. See Editorial, The Mormon “World”, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1882, at 4. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Mehr, supra note 96, at 188 (citing With the Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
1883, at 4). 
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presenting a narrative of Mormons as so immoral that God must have 
produced them to give all other Christians a reason to unite in 
opposition.125  To use William Handley’s phrase about growing up 
Mormon,126 The New York Times’ characterization signifies a 
“totalizing narrative” among Americans regarding the Mormons, one 
in which, morally speaking, there appeared to be no middle ground. 
Such sweeping condemnations of polygamy, like the Church’s 
dogmatic pronouncements, created a morally stark dialectic of public 
narratives that could only have obscured the complex nature of the 
polygamous experience, especially for the Mormon women asked to 
embrace it.  Thoughtful voices were few, but notable.  For example, 
John Stuart Mill, perhaps annoyed with the sheer volume of ridicule 
applied to Mormon polygamists, or alert to the hypocrisy of a larger 
culture blind to its own conventional forms of misogyny and marital 
inequality, called for a more careful approach to the Mormon 
question.127  Marveling at “the language of downright persecution 
which breaks out from the press of this country whenever it feels 
called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism,”128 
Mill argued a kind of “pro-choice” position on the issue of plural 
marriage: 
It must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on 
the part of the women concerned in it . . . as is the case with any 
other form of the marriage institution . . . .  I cannot admit that 
persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and 
require that a condition of things with which all who are directly 
interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it 
is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant who have no 
part or concern in it.129 
From our vantage point, Mill’s position may seem somewhat 
archaic, even gratuitous.  That is, whether Mormon women were 
making a genuinely voluntary choice to accept plural marriages now 
seems highly debatable in the glare of the post-modern universe, 
where the idea of the autonomous will of the liberal subject, and the 
                                                          
 125. See also Firmage, supra note 38, at 766-67 (describing the climate of 
nineteenth-century America as one permeated by a “Christian nation attitude” and a 
widespread belief that “‘the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon 
[C]hristianity’” (citing People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. 1811)). 
 126. William R. Handley, Mormonism and Other Narratives of the Living Dead, in 
ONE NATION UNDER GOD?:  RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 240-43 (Marjorie Garber 
& Rebecca L. Walkowitz eds., 1999). 
 127. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 92-94 (F.S. Crofts & Co. 1947) (observing 
the moral incongruity that occurs when “polygamy . . . seems to excite unquenchable 
animosity when practiced by persons who . . . profess to be a kind of Christians”). 
 128. Id. at 112. 
 129. Id. at 113-14. 
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machinery of individual consent, have been considered increasingly 
problematic.130  Yet Mill, for one, was consistent on the question of 
gender equality, having published writings that opposed sex 
discrimination, including the sex discrimination of nineteenth-
century marriage laws.131 
Moreover, to fairly evaluate the nineteenth-century Mormon 
woman’s choice to accept plural marriage, we must consider the 
difficult and complex implications of that choice in historical 
context.132  Martha Bradley and Mary Woodward have pointed out 
that for nineteenth-century Mormon women, choosing to believe in 
the divine calling of Joseph Smith was itself a kind of threshold 
paradigm choice of epistemological significance, one which narrowed 
ensuing practical decisions.133  In this sense, polygamy was another 
version of the classic narrative of faith versus reason: 
A feminist interpretation of . . . plural marriage sees that, although 
women were willing to restructure their lives along new and often 
radical lines, they believed Joseph Smith was expressing the will of 
God by recreating patriarchal precedents from the Bible.  Mormon 
patriarchy reflected his attempt to redefine, reorder, and maintain 
social control through male priesthood.  He did this by invoking 
the moral authority of revelation, priesthood power, and the 
principle of obedience.  We must not underestimate the impact of 
Smith’s prologue of visions and angels in his private instructions to 
young women.  If they believed, the logical consequence was their 
total submission to his judgment, his authority, and his power.  If 
they did not believe this, there was no way for them to remain 
                                                          
 130. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636 (1983);  Anne S. Kasper, 
Consciousness Re-Evaluated: Interpretive Theory and Feminist Scholarship, 56 SOC. 
INQUIRY 30 (1986). 
 131. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 55-57 (London, 
Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer 1869) (condemning the legal obligations inherent 
in a marriage contract that effectively make a wife a slave to her husband). 
 132. See PAUL RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED: RELIGION, NARRATIVE, AND 
IMAGINATION 35 (Mark I. Wall ed., David Pellawer trans., Fortress Press 1995) (arguing 
that such contextualization requires that we consider also the terms of the spiritual 
narrative by which such women were living their lives). 
[F]or a philosophical inquiry, a religious faith may be identified through its 
language, or, to speak more accurately, as a kind of discourse.  This . . . 
contention does not say that language, that linguistic expression, is the only 
dimension of the religious phenomenon; nothing is said—either pro or 
con—concerning the controversial notion of religious experience, whether 
we understand experience in a cognitive, a practical, or an emotional sense.  
What is said is only this: whatever ultimately may be the nature of the so-
called religious experience, it comes to language, it is articulated in a 
language, and the most appropriate place to interpret it on its own terms is to 
inquire into its linguistic expression. 
Id. 
 133. See Bradley & Woodward, supra note 96. 
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members of his church.134 
Bradley and Woodward further observe that for nineteenth-century 
American women generally, marriage was a categorical decision of 
inestimable impact, “the first moment in their adult lives when they 
were empowered.  Choosing to marry or not to marry, and whom to 
marry, radically changed the boundaries of their lives.”135 
Given the dramatic nature of the marriage decision, it becomes 
comprehensible that a woman might have entered plural marriage 
out of what anthropologist Rex Cooper has called “a fear[] for 
survival.”136  Indeed, if a woman came to invest her belief in what she 
felt was the grandeur of Mormon theology, accepting polygamy 
“might be regarded as an attempt to maintain Mormon group identity 
and provide for Mormon salvation despite any eventuality.”137  Were 
these women sophisticated enough to be “tracking [their own] causes 
home,”138 or were they making life-altering choices heavily mediated 
by their belief in Joseph Smith’s narrative of sacrifice and salvation?  
Although the latter seems the more likely scenario, the sheer novelty 
of plural marriage for these women suggests that at least some 
experienced a kind of “self-knowledge, a self-creation”—that is, in the 
radical choice to accept life as a plural wife.139 
Of course, the clash of narratives never ceases.  For instance, 
somewhat ironically, some Mormon women also linked these 
concerns about survival and identity to what they viewed as a larger, 
more progressive sensibility about their religion: “[w]hen they chose 
to enter a patriarchal religious community, they did so because they 
                                                          
 134. Id. at 116.  Lucy W. Kimball’s account of being proposed to by Joseph Smith 
himself is telling: 
When the Prophet Joseph Smith first mentioned the principle of plural 
marriage to me I became very indignant, and told him emphatically that I did 
not wish him ever to mention it to me again, as my feelings and education 
revolted against any thing of such a nature.  He counseled me, however, to 
pray to the Lord for light and understanding . . . [and] after I had poured 
out my heart’s contents before God, I at once became calm and composed; a 
feeling of happiness took possession of me, and at the same time I received a 
powerful and irresistible testimony of the truth of plural marriage, which 
testimony has abided with me ever since. 
Goodson, supra note 96, at 91 (citing 6 THE HIST. REC. 229-30 (1887)). 
 135. Bradley & Woodward, supra note 96, at 114. 
 136. REX EUGENE COOPER, PROMISES MADE TO THE FATHERS: MORMON COVENANT 
ORGANIZATION 137 (Univ. of Utah Press 1990) (1989).  For example, Mercy 
Thompson, who became a plural wife of Hyrum Smith, Joseph Smith’s brother, 
remarked that “I dared not refuse to obey the counsel [to enter plural marriage], lest 
peradventure I should be found fighting against God.”  See Goodson, supra note 96, 
at 91 (citing 6 THE HIST. REC. 229 (1887)). 
 137. COOPER, supra note 136, at 137. 
 138. RORTY, supra note 74, at 19 n.74. 
 139. Id. 
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believed that the gender system was organized around family-centered 
and woman-oriented values.  The network of familial relationships 
created through plural marriage created a new and unique sense of 
community, of family and of self.”140  From this perspective, many 
Mormon women saw polygamy as “a new social institution that they 
were able to accept by redefining it in terms of a female world 
view.”141 
These progressive images of self and community reflect more a 
narrative of nineteenth-century American utopian yearning than they 
do the predominant nineteenth-century Christian narrative of 
patriarchal order.142  And despite the obvious contextual differences, 
such images seem similar to what Catherine MacKinnon has suggested 
is the Sisyphean narrative of feminist methodology—to make possible 
the “expression of women’s situation, in which the struggle for 
consciousness is a struggle for world: for a sexuality, a history, a 
culture, a community, a form of power, an experience of the 
sacred.”143 
Some Mormon women chose to experience the polygamy narrative 
as one that enabled expanded identity and self-empowerment; as 
discussed at the opening of this article, such women engaged in a 
surprising political activism that made patriarchal church declarations 
seem incongruous with these women’s real experiences and 
opinions.144  For example, Mormon women organized the successful 
campaign for suffrage in Utah, which left anti-Mormon critics 
perplexed as to “why the ‘last outpost of barbarism’ should have 
extended the vote to women in 1870, fifty years before the nation 
adopted the Nineteenth Amendment and decades before women’s 
suffrage had acquired respectability elsewhere.”145 
As discussed in the opening of this article, some Mormon women 
also published the Woman’s Exponent,146 a journal that was 
decidedly outspoken on political and social matters of the day.  One 
editorial said this of the relative importance of men in women’s lives: 
Is there then nothing worth living for, but to be petted, humored, 
                                                          
 140. Bradley & Woodward, supra note 96, at 117. 
 141. Id. at 112. 
 142. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 29, at 81 (observing that both the nineteenth-
century Christian majority and the American government viewed polygamy as 
“patriarchal despotism”). 
 143. Mackinnon, supra note 130, at 637. 
 144. See supra Introduction. 
 145. Dushku, supra note 1, at 177 (arguing that “Utah’s women [in the nineteenth 
century] were indeed misunderstood.  In important respects, they still are.”). 
 146. Part of the legacy of that Journal is Exponent II, an independent quarterly 
published in Arlington, Massachusetts, by contemporary Mormon women. 
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and caressed, by a man?  That is all very well as far as it goes, but 
that man is the only thing in existence worth living for I fail to see . 
. . .  And when men see that women can exist without their being 
constantly at hand, that they can learn to be self-reliant or depend 
upon each other for more or less happiness, it will perhaps take a 
little of the conceit out of some of them.147 
The idea of depending “upon each other for more or less 
happiness” makes sense within the “empowerment” narrative of plural 
marriage when one considers the significant personal implications of 
plural marriage for a Mormon woman: 
[T]he practical requirements of living as plural wives challenged 
the limiting stereotype of women accepted by civilized America.  A 
plural wife could not be the helpless, fainting, protected female or 
she would likely faint alone.  Plural wives often had to look to 
themselves rather than their husbands for financial support and 
physical labor.  For practical purposes many were more like widows 
than traditional wives.  The regular absence of their husbands 
simplified their housekeeping chores, allowing them to participate 
in a broader range of activities than their eastern sisters.  In one of 
the neatest ironic contradictions of the period, the “enslaved 
harems” of Utah produced some of America’s most efficient early 
feminists.148 
From these accounts, it is difficult not to see something of a cultural 
anomaly in the complex experience of Mormon polygamous women, 
notwithstanding simplistic public narratives coming from both the 
church and its critics. 
Still, I am mindful that in suggesting another cultural narrative for 
Mormon polygamy (an “empowerment narrative,” coexistent with the 
dialectical “women-in-bondage” and “spiritual superiority” narratives 
championed by critics and proponents of polygamy), I am relying on 
a current historical narrative constructed by present-day Mormon 
feminist scholars.  I point this out because of the importance, in doing 
“literary”149 reading, of candidly “tracking” the “causes” of one’s own 
narrative,150 as it were.  I believe this approach enriches literary and 
avoids fundamentalist reading, because it acknowledges the real 
ambiguities that reside in a given narrative. 
Here, for example, the motives and values of the present-day 
                                                          
 147. Dushku, supra note 1, at 194-95 (citing 3 WOMAN’S EXPONENT 67 (Sept. 30, 
1874)). 
 148. Id. at xxix. 
 149. See SCHOLES, CRAFTY, supra note 62, at 238-39 (advocating a way of reading—
“literary”—that allows readers to recognize the text’s complexity, criticize it, and 
freely accept or reject values they have discovered within). 
 150. See RORTY, supra note 74, at 19 n.74. 
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women writing the nineteenth-century polygamy empowerment 
narrative are quite possibly diverse and conflicted: being women, 
scholars, and Mormons themselves might encourage any number of 
empowerment and bondage feelings about their early Mormon 
counterparts, depending on the writers’ intellectual values, historical 
methodologies, identity politics, personal relationships to the 
Mormon church, and so on.  To read the experience of Mormon 
plural wives with a fundamentalist sensibility, on the other hand, 
would yield a more ideologically beholden, homogenous, and settled 
narrative—one more likely to conceal, however unwittingly, uncertain 
facts and attitudes that do not cleanly square with the overarching, 
mediating narrative being expounded. 
Whatever our assessment of this contemporary empowerment 
narrative of nineteenth-century polygamy, it is clear that some of the 
women who experienced that life forged and lived by an 
empowerment narrative.  Of course, this may have been the most 
meaningful alternative for women who were typically strong, 
educated, and often well beyond their teenage years.151  Perhaps 
there is something apologist about the empowerment narrative being 
told by these current Mormon scholars.  Yet is it not human nature 
(especially among the religious) to seek or create narratives that 
justify one’s self, family, and community?  This alone is not fatal to 
good reading; rather, it would seem to be an inevitable aspect of self-
narration.  Haber eloquently reminds us of what is truly indispensable 
to the literary reader—recognizing that “there is no view from 
nowhere,” that where our reading and writing energies actually matter 
is in remaining vigilant and honest about our mediating backgrounds 
and convictions.152 
Thus there is no shame, nor need there be harm, in recognizing, if 
indeed we see them, meaning and value in past and present 
empowerment and bondage narratives of women in polygamy.  I see 
much value, for example, in the empowerment narrative constructed 
by late twentieth-century Mormon feminist historians, if only because 
their research and writing about the complexity of a woman’s 
polygamy experience produces a literary counter-narrative to the 
generally sanitized, fundamentalist, “unknowing”153 narrative of 
                                                          
 151. See, e.g., Jill C. Mulvay, Zion’s Schoolmarms, in MORMON SISTERS: WOMEN IN 
EARLY UTAH 177 (Claudia L. Bushman ed., Utah State Univ. Press 2d ed. 1997) 
(1976). 
 152. HABER, supra note 79, at 1. 
 153. BLOOM, supra note 29.  Bloom suggests that, ultimately, the “American 
Religion” may not be any sect or faith so much as a narrow, settled, habit of mind, an 
unwillingness to know ourselves honestly and thus an incomprehension as to our 
spiritual identity—all, ironically, the product of our dogged determination to “know” 
things with reassuring certainty more than with nuanced understanding.  As Bloom 
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polygamy maintained by today’s mainstream LDS Church.154  And in 
the end, the clash of polygamy narratives across time opens a door to 
more interpretive possibilities still, as well as a glimpse of the endless, 
trans-historical, trans-cultural nature of narrativity.155 
Mormon polygamy was not unique as an example of the complexity 
of women’s experience being appropriated by dominant moral 
narratives of a patriarchal culture.  By any account, that always has 
been the case.  But polygamy forced an unusually excruciating 
decision on the women asked to practice it, a decision whose 
complexity was seldom if ever acknowledged in the rhetorical battles 
fought on the stage of public morality.  As Claudia Bushman has 
described it: 
For the women of Zion the importance of polygamy cannot be 
                                                          
laments: “[T]he American Religion, which is nothing if not a knowing, does not know 
itself.  Perhaps this is a permanent and general American irony . . . ; we may be 
uniquely the nation where the knowers cannot know themselves.”  Id. at 263-64. 
 154. The official LDS Church position on historical scholarship, particularly 
regarding the controversial experience of polygamy, resides on the literal-
fundamentalist side of the reading and narrative spectrum.  Scholes could well be 
referring to the perspective of today’s mainstream LDS Church as to its own past 
when he observes that “fundamentalist reading is always marked by shifts from the 
literal to the figurative—as a way of concealing conflicts.”  SCHOLES, CRAFTY, supra 
note 62, at 231.  Because the history of Mormonism is effectively a history of conflicts, 
there is much to conceal.  Indeed, the mainstream Mormon church has devoted itself 
to, and achieved, a remarkable assimilation into mainstream American culture over 
the last century.  Cf. Mauss, supra note 47, at 58 (arguing that as a result of such 
successful assimilation, actual efforts have been taken by Mormons to restore some of 
the earlier tension with the rest of American culture in order to redefine their unique 
identity).  There is no shortage of motives for the church to address its own history 
with a fierce commitment to an apologist literalism characteristic of fundamentalist 
reading.  Thus, for example, Mormon orthodoxy requires a strict reading of the 
peculiar and astonishing facts of Joseph Smith’s visions and revelations (including the 
conspicuous fact that the gold plates from which Smith translated the Book of 
Mormon were promptly taken from the earth by the angel Moroni).  Yet regarding 
polygamy, which, as discussed in Part I, was central to Smith’s vision of Christ’s true 
“latter-day” church and was the defining ordeal for nineteenth-century Mormons, the 
contemporary church waxes so figurative as to be virtually unresponsive to serious 
historical inquiry, whether from external critics or its own members.  See Handley, 
supra note 126, at 240-43 (noting “Mormonism’s absolute claims to truth”).  See 
generally THE NEW MORMON HISTORY:  REVISIONIST ESSAYS ON THE PAST (D. Michael 
Quinn ed., 1992); D. MICHAEL QUINN, THE MORMON HIERARCHY:  EXTENSIONS OF 
POWER (Signature Books 1997); SHIPPS, supra note 29; BLOOM, supra note 29, at 77-
128.  Quinn, formerly an LDS church member in good standing and a history 
professor at the church’s Brigham Young University, was excommunicated from the 
church in 1993 for his scholarly interrogations of sensitive aspects of Mormon history 
and doctrine, including polygamy. 
 155. See, e.g., Steven Chapman, Two’s Company: Three’s a Marriage, SLATE, June 
5, 2001, http://slate.msn.com/toolbar.aspx?action+print&id=109334 (observing that 
“[w]ith divorce rates high, out-of-wedlock births rampant, and most kids fated to 
spend at least some of their childhood in single-parent homes, the American family 
obviously has some serious problems.  [Notorious polygamist] Tom Green is not one 
of them.”). For example, a growing number of cultural critics argue today that it 
makes little or no sense to continue criminalizing polygamy, so long as the plural 
marriages in question are truly consensual.  Id. 
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overstressed, even though only a small proportion of the populace 
was directly involved.  The Mormon sisters were required to defend 
the Principle or leave the Church entirely.  They had to make plural 
marriage work to prove they were right.  The Principle, more than 
anything else, set up a competition between the Mormons and the 
Gentiles, the first intent on proving their righteousness and the 
second on forcing the miscreant group to recant their evil ways.156 
These conditions likely guaranteed that, among nineteenth-century 
Mormon women, the very choice whether to accept plural marriage, 
and its heavy personal consequences, created a charged atmosphere 
of stringent moral competition in which nuanced and meaningful 
public dialogue about plural marriage, let alone about underlying 
issues of family configuration, gender politics, and identity, was 
virtually impossible. 
The principal clash of public narratives over Mormon polygamy in 
nineteenth-century America was, by any standard, fundamentalist, 
although some subsidiary narratives, whether of the libertarian kind 
expressed by John Stuart Mill or the communitarian-feminist kind 
forged by a number of Mormon polygamous wives, occasionally lifted 
the camouflage of self-righteous, disingenuously figurative oratory 
that concealed the monopolistic (literalist) intentions of the main 
combatants in the narrative battle over plural marriage. 
It is only now that the ambiguous narrative of those women, at that 
time, in those circumstances, is being thoughtfully reconstructed, and 
as such, the narrative of women living in “the Principle” in the 
nineteenth century has assumed a measure of authenticity, and thus 
cultural legitimacy, at least among some of us who read that narrative 
today, identify with conflicts and concerns it evokes, and are 
compelled to think about ourselves more deeply and to read and 
write our narratives more circumspectly. 
D.  Legal Narratives of Mormon Polygamy 
Nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy was contested on the public 
stage not only through cultural narratives, but also through legal 
narratives—narratives of social order preserved through the highly 
formalized medium of judicial discourse.157  In particular, I want to 
examine one truly consequential judicial narrative of polygamy: the 
Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Reynolds v. United States, in which 
                                                          
 156. Claudia L. Bushman, Introduction to MORMON SISTERS: WOMEN IN EARLY 
UTAH, supra note 1, at xix. 
 157. See GORDON, supra note 29, at 209 (explaining lawyers’ and judges’ “use of 
legal structures to reform local societies in the interest of Protestant morals and 
monogamous marriage”). 
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the Court upheld federal laws illegalizing polygamy.158 
Leaving aside for now the outcome of the Court’s decision, the 
Reynolds opinion is a telling narrative of the preeminence of social 
order because the opinion exemplifies the dynamics and implications 
of judicial rhetoric, especially the necessary acts of judicial framing of 
and syllogistic reasoning about social conflicts, and the judicial 
bequest of cultural legitimacy that follows from those operations.159  
The opinion also embodies, and is mediated by, other powerful 
“authority” narratives of American law, including the ideals of social 
tradition, legal precedent, value neutrality, and principled decision-
making, which serve to uphold the larger narrative of maintaining 
social order.160  Understanding this matrix of legal narratives is 
crucial to understanding how the law uniquely frames and resolves 
social conflict.161 
In his introduction to Law and the Order of Culture, Robert Post 
identifies the dynamic relationship between law—in the largest sense, 
our system of social order—and the ambient culture.162  Post argues 
that “social order requires the mediation of social meaning, and that 
social meaning arises through the operation of systems that are 
simultaneously symbolic and practical . . . .”163  This formulation 
provides us with an enlarged view of how law functions to both reflect 
and stimulate our ongoing sense of “the order of things.”164  Michel 
Foucault deftly located this sense of order in the relation between a 
society’s “ordering codes” and its “reflections upon order itself”—and 
we could recast this relation as that between society’s “narratives of 
order” and its “overarching, evolving narrative about order itself.”165  
This order-oriented framework of the law is important because it 
helps us think about how the American judiciary, as the foremost 
formal source of our “ordering codes,” frames social controversies so 
                                                          
 158. See generally 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (declaring that polygamy was not protected 
as an exercise of religion under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause). 
 159. See Clayton, supra note 41, at 46 (identifying Reynolds as the decision 
through which “Jefferson’s famous phrase ‘wall of separation between Church and 
State’ first entered into American law.”). 
 160. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67 (narrating, for example, the value-neutral role 
of a law that does not “interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, [but 
constitutionally does so] with practices[,]” because to not do so would permit a 
person to make “professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the 
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”). 
 161. See infra Part III (discussing judicial operations in the context of the legal 
treatment of homosexuals). 
 162. See generally LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE vii-xvii (Robert Post ed., 1991). 
 163. Id. at vii. 
 164. The term is Foucault’s. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES xxiii (Random House 1994) (1966). 
 165. Id. at xxi. 
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as to maintain the larger social order. 
Specifically, where bondage versus empowerment of women and 
the deviant, immoral sexuality of polygamy were narratives deployed 
by critics of polygamy in nineteenth-century America, judicial 
commentators on the subject of polygamy focused on the value of the 
narrative of social order.  Yet how the judiciary works to regulate and 
maintain this narrative of order is a complicated, multi-faceted 
process.  For example, in executing its role at the center of the Anglo-
American common law system, the Supreme Court labors under a 
truly unique rhetorical burden, constructing and presenting its 
opinions, in which it publicly represents and resolves complex social 
questions, in ways that maintain what it perceives to be the prevailing 
social order and justify its decisions in legally legitimate terms and 
principles.  These terms and principles amount to compact narratives 
of legitimacy, for each enables the necessary public justification of the 
opinion and thus adds weight to the court’s decision as a social 
template—as a precedent for future similar situations. 
James Boyd White, as astute reader of judicial opinions, provides a 
rich characterization of what is at work in a judicial opinion, arguably 
the highest form of legal narrative: 
The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the case, 
telling its story in a particular way; it explains or justifies the result; 
and in the process it connects the case with earlier cases, the 
particular facts with more general concerns.  It translates the 
experience of the parties, and the languages in which they naturally 
speak of it, into the language of the law, which connects cases 
across time and space; and it translates the texts of the law—the 
statutes and opinions and constitutional provisions—into the terms 
defined by the facts of the present case.  The opinion thus engages 
in the central conversation that is for us the law, a conversation that 
the opinion itself makes possible.  In doing these things it makes 
two claims of authority: for the texts and judgments to which it 
appeals, and for the methods by which it works.166 
With this critical orientation in mind, let us briefly follow the public 
debate about the perceived threat of Mormon polygamy to the social 
and political order of nineteenth-century America, before we turn to 
the Reynolds decision itself. 
In 1856, Brigham Young, in one of many such imperious 
statements, declared that “[t]he sound of polygamy is a terror to the 
pretended republican government.  Why?  Because this work is 
                                                          
 166. White, supra note 25, at 1367-68; see also JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS 
TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 215-69 (1990) [hereinafter 
WHITE, JUSTICE]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW:  ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND 
POETICS OF THE LAW 28-48 (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW]. 
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destined to revolutionize the world and bring all under 
subjection.”167  Young’s towering predictions of social revolution were 
not exclusively concerned with the governmental order, but with the 
larger social order as well.  As historian Michael Quinn describes it, 
The Saints spoke directly to questions absorbing many others at the 
time—sexuality, health, and home, but posited polygamy as the 
solution to these ills.  Mormon polygamy was not simply counter-
cultural, it was the highest form of marriage relationship.  The 
Latter-Day Saints did not recognize the disaster if non-Mormons 
believed Mormon defenses of polygamy.  If polygamy was the real 
answer to society’s ills, then ‘Gentiles’ had every reason to fear that 
Mormon polygamy was the marriage relationship to end all other 
marriage relationships.168 
Such official Mormon representations of polygamy were 
understandably threatening, especially to those concerned with the 
American legal order.  Indeed, such seemingly hegemonic 
projections, however figuratively they may have been intended, would 
lead someone like Congressman Cradlebaugh of Nevada to issue the 
warning that “people in our midst . . . are building up, consolidating, 
and daringly carrying out a system, subversive of the Constitution and 
laws, and fatal to morals and true religion”.169 
In light of such apocalyptic predictions, the public understandably 
perceived Mormonism as a threat to the ideals of individualism, the 
monogamous family, and the rule of law—cherished elements of the 
classic liberal nineteenth-century American cultural order.  Historian 
David Brion Davis has summarized this tension in terms quite 
sympathetic to the Mormon narrative of community: 
[The Mormon] gospel of work was communal rather than 
individual, and they took out to the frontier with them an 
organization and an outlook that was guaranteed to alienate the 
selfish and violent individualists who were to surround them.  If you 
followed a new Enoch west in order to build a new Zion, then you 
were engaged in nation building of a kind very different from your 
neighbors’ mode of enlarging the republic.170 
This incompatibility of narratives of community and individualism 
characterized much of the relationship of American law to Mormon 
polygamy in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Indeed, fear 
of the Mormon threat to the American cultural order seemed to 
                                                          
 167. Sheldon, supra note 12, at 115. 
 168. D. Michael Quinn, Plural Marriage and the Mormon Twilight Zone, 16 
SUNSTONE: MORMON EXPERIENCE, SCHOLARSHIP, ISSUES, AND ART 58 (1993). 
 169. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d. Sess. 119 1863 (statement of Rep. John 
Cradlebaugh). 
 170. BLOOM, supra note 29, at 103. 
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animate the entire public legal conversation about the Mormons. 
As I have mentioned, the Mormon polygamous threat infused 
Congressional debate (especially when slavery was at issue) in the 
1850s and 1860s, leading to Congressional passage of The Morrill Act 
in 1862, the first of several pieces of federal legislation designed to 
eliminate Mormon polygamy.171  The Morrill Act invalidated all Utah 
laws that “‘establish, support, maintain, shield, or countenance 
polygamy’” and made bigamy a crime punishable by a maximum fine 
of five hundred dollars and a maximum incarceration of five years.172  
Yet the Morrill Act, while “constitutionally pure, . . . [was] practically 
worthless.”173 
Indeed, in a territory where three-quarters of the population was 
Mormon, bigamy prosecution became a farce: “polygamists went into 
hiding in the ‘Underground,’ key witnesses disappeared, plural wives 
refused to testify against their husbands, and sympathetic juries would 
not convict.”174  Moreover, the Civil War and Reconstruction 
occupied the federal government until the mid-1870s, after which the 
government more forcefully turned its attention to “the Mormon 
Question.”175  Responding to President Ulysses Grant’s call for new 
legislation to outlaw this “barbarism” Congress passed the Poland Act 
of 1874, “which divested the Mormon-controlled probate courts of 
their power to hear civil, chancery, and criminal actions [and] 
transferred jurisdiction over all important cases to the federal 
territorial courts.”176 
Hence the Morrill Act had little effect until 1874, when its 
constitutionality was tested in the case against George Reynolds, 
private secretary to Brigham Young and a practicing polygamist.177  
That case reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1878.  Generally 
speaking, the Court addressed the question of whether plural 
marriage, which the Mormons asserted was essential to their religion, 
was protected as the free exercise of religion guaranteed under the 
                                                          
 171. The Morrill Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 
1910). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Jay Davis, The Polygamous Prelude, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 9-10 (1962). 
 174. Magrath, supra note 39, at 534. 
 175. See GORDON, supra note 29, at 55, 119-20 (noting that “[t]he erosion of a 
national commitment to [Reconstruction after the Civil War] actually increased the 
attention paid to . . . polygamy” as did Republicans’ recognition that taking “decisive 
action on the ‘twin relic of barbarism’”—polygamy being one and slavery the other—
would quell criticisms of their “commitment to humanitarian principles”). 
 176. Magrath, supra note 39, at 521. 
 177. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (considering whether 
the Act, in criminalizing a religious practice, violates the First Amendment’s mandate 
that Congress cannot pass a law that prohibits the free exercise of religion). 
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First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Specifically, the question 
presented to the Court was whether George Reynolds, who was 
married to two women, could be prosecuted under a federal bigamy 
law178 that criminalized plural marriage of any kind.  Although the 
Mormons expected the Court to rule in their favor, the justices made 
this the occasion for establishing a critical distinction in First 
Amendment doctrine between religious belief and religious 
conduct—a doctrinal boundary that remains valid today.179 
The Reynolds opinion, authored by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, is 
significant for many reasons, but here I will focus on how Waite 
moved rhetorically to frame and resolve the fundamental problem 
that this case presented: the threat to social order posed by Mormon 
plural marriage.180  In setting the context for the Court’s decision, 
the Chief Justice began by problematizing the meaning of religion 
itself: 
The word “religion” is not defined in the Constitution.  We must go 
elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more 
appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in the midst 
of which the [First Amendment] was adopted.  The precise point of 
the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom that has been 
guaranteed.181 
Waite then drew on the deepening historical and philosophical 
roots of First Amendment doctrine, quoting Thomas Jefferson’s 
flowery formulation to assert the crucial distinction between belief 
and practice: 
“[T]o suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field 
of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of 
principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy 
                                                          
 178. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253 (1874). 
 179. The Supreme Court has continued to rely on this distinction since Reynolds.  
The reader may recall the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith, in which the 
Court prohibited a Native American tribe from using peyote for the purpose of 
experiencing religious visions, reasoning that the practice was in conflict with federal 
and state narcotics laws.  494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
invoked Reynolds on this point.  See id. at 878-79 (asserting that the Court first 
established in Reynolds the principle “that an individual’s religious beliefs [do 
not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct 
that the State is free to regulate.”).  Scalia also relied on the belief-conduct distinction 
in his dissent in Romer v. Evans.  See 517 U.S. 620, 640-41 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing “that the Constitution does not prohibit what virtually all States 
had done from the founding of the Republic until very recent years—making 
homosexual conduct a crime.  That holding is unassailable, except by those 
who think that the Constitution changes to suit current fashions.”). 
 180. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (using provocative hypotheticals to frame the 
problem: “Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of 
religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under 
which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”). 
 181. Id. at 162. 
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which at once destroys all religious liberty,” it is declared “that it is 
time enough for rightful purposes of civil government for its 
officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts 
against peace and good order.”  In these two sentences is found the 
true distinction between what properly belongs to the church and 
what to the State.182 
Having initiated his approach to the problem of plural marriage by 
setting himself firmly on Jefferson’s formidable shoulders, Waite 
proceeded to build and refine that framework, quoting Jefferson’s 
famous articulations that “religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God” and “the legislative powers of the 
government reach actions only, not opinions”; these axioms, Waite 
suggested, formed the basis for America’s proverbial “wall of 
separation between church and State.”183 
On this historical foundation Waite planted a standard by which to 
evaluate the problematic social practice of Mormon polygamy: 
Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates 
of the . . . [First Amendment], it may be accepted almost as an 
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment 
thus secured.  Congress was deprived of all legislative power over 
mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in 
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.184 
The rhetorical decision to twice frame the problem this way—to 
make subversion of good order the threshold criterion for First 
Amendment protection of religious behavior—helps illuminate the 
subtle, easily effaced and naturalized, but deeply significant 
relationship between the putatively clean pronouncements of the 
American judiciary and the complex, concrete social issues that give 
rise to those abstract decisions. 
Let us recall Robert Post’s observation about the dynamic, if uneasy, 
relationship between law and the surrounding culture in which law, 
our official system of order, lives and breathes.  Post emphasizes the 
fluid and far-ranging interpretive possibilities that reside in judicial 
acts (“social order requires the mediation of social meaning, and that 
social meaning arises through the operation of systems that are 
simultaneously symbolic and practical . . . .”).185  Post’s formulation of 
the relationship between law and culture, beyond acknowledging the 
heavy social ramifications of judicial decisions (as opposed to, say, the 
less immediately pragmatic consequences of the public utterances of 
                                                          
 182. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. at 164. 
 184. Id. (emphasis added). 
 185. LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE, supra note 162, at vii. 
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literary theorists), provides an enlarged view of how law functions 
both to reflect and to stimulate our evolving sense of the order of 
things. 
I continue to focus here on this basic sense of social order because 
it helps us think about how the American judiciary, a salient source 
and the primary arbiter of our ordering codes, frames cultural 
controversies like polygamy so as to serve and maintain the larger 
social order itself (whatever that might be), which in turn determines 
how particular definitions of identity—both community and 
individual—may or may not legitimately inhabit the larger culture.  
Thus in 1878 Chief Justice Waite could invoke well known and 
authoritative political, social, and moral narratives inherited from the 
Founding Fathers in order to frame the legal question regarding 
polygamy as a simple, if vague, query about whether it was “subversive 
of good order.”186 
Yet having reduced the legal resolution of the problem to this 
single question, Waite would not ponder the seemingly complex 
meanings of good order, let alone consider what conduct could 
amount to subversion of it, even though he had paused earlier to 
meditate on the problem of defining religion, something equally 
fundamental to the Court’s determination of whether polygamy 
should receive Constitutional protection.  Rather, Waite moved 
directly from framing the legal question as whether polygamy was 
subversive of good order to concluding, through terse historical 
summary, that polygamy was indeed problematic to the established 
social order of western civilization: 
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western 
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon 
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and 
African people.  At common law, the second marriage was always 
void . . . , and from the earliest history of England polygamy has 
been treated as an offence against society.187 
Whatever one’s view of plural marriage, the Chief Justice’s 
reasoning here seems somewhat conclusory and detached, suggesting 
that historical precedent alone justifies what we desire in our social 
order and implying that a practice such as polygamy could be 
accommodated only by the social order of cultures foreign to our 
own.188 
                                                          
 186. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
 187. See id. (noting that Western Civilizations have historically condemned the 
practice of polygamy). 
 188. See id. (comparing cultural attitudes towards polygamy in Western and 
certain non-Western cultures). 
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Such one-dimensional cultural analysis, although not uncommon in 
judicial discourse, raises difficult questions about what precisely the 
Court meant in defining religion a la Jefferson as a “matter which lies 
solely between man and his God.”  Surely even this robust concept 
had its limits, for Chief Justice Waite had no compunctions about 
condemning the faith of those who “believed human sacrifices were a 
necessary part of religious worship,”189 just as, for example, 
Congressman Ward of Illinois, in an influential Congressional debate 
five years before Reynolds, had seen no valid legal distinction between 
Mormon polygamy, which “sacrifices women to the lusts of men,” and 
those so-called “religions” in whose name “the widow mounts the 
funeral pyre of India,” or for which “helpless infants are sacrificed in 
the waters of the Ganges.”190 Rather, such arguments seemed 
secondary to the deeper anxiety that Mormon polygamy was, as the 
Chief Justice had concluded, subversive of good order. 
Despite the inconsistencies and selective myopia of the Reynolds 
opinion, from a rhetorical standpoint we see also the careful 
construction of a compelling legal narrative, the telling of a story 
based on reasoning that serves to justify a clear legal answer to a 
pressing social question in the eyes of the story’s intended readership.  
Here the author of the legal narrative, Chief Justice Waite, appeals 
widely to sources of authority which he knows the audience will 
respect: established moral traditions, legislative decisions, and 
recognized and established processes of rational argument.  In short, 
we see here American law’s unique blend of rhetoric and logic, a story 
of core values confirmed and preserved in a principled way. 
First, in Waite’s argument for history and tradition, he gives the 
follow account: 
In connection with the case we are now considering, it is a 
significant fact that on the 8th of December, 1788, after the passage 
of the act establishing religious freedom, and after the convention 
of Virginia had recommended as an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States the declaration in a bill of rights 
that “all men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the 
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience,” 
the legislature of that State substantially enacted the statute of 
James I [prohibiting polygamy], death penalty included, because, as 
recited in the preamble, “it hath been doubted whether bigamy or 
poligamy [sic] be punishable by the laws of this Commonwealth.”  
                                                          
 189. See id. at 166 (suggesting that “civil government” should be permitted to 
prohibit certain religious practices that it considers particularly socially harmful). 
 190. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 13, at 113 (citing the June 1874 comments of 
Representative Ward of Illinois, in which the Congressman compared polygamy to 
foreign religious practices he considered unacceptable in Western society). 
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12 Hening’s Stat. 691.  From that day to this we think it may safely 
be said there never has been a time in any State of the Union when 
polygamy has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the 
civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.191 
Waite seems to suggest that this behavior should be criminalized 
merely because it has been so for a very long time, just as, more than a 
century later, Justice Byron White would invoke tradition as a 
compelling ground for upholding state laws making consensual 
homosexual conduct a crime.192 
Next, Waite relies on popular political theory of the time to argue 
that polygamy is a kind of dictatorship at the family level, which can 
lead to a breakdown in democracy at the national level: 
In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the 
constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to 
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of 
social life.  Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, 
is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually 
regulated by law.  Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of 
its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, 
with which government is necessarily required to deal.  In fact, 
according as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, 
do we find principles on which the government of the people, to a 
greater or less extent, rests.  Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to 
the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large 
communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that 
principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.  
Chancellor Kent observes that this remark is equally striking and 
profound.  2 Kent, Com. 81, note (e).  An exceptional colony of 
polygamists under an exceptional leadership may sometimes exist 
for a time without appearing to disturb the social condition of the 
people who surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless 
restricted by some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate 
scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether 
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its 
dominion.193 
In the end, then, there are reasons to admire the Chief Justice’s 
handiwork here.  Throughout the Reynolds opinion, Waite weaves 
together on the loom of legal reasoning strands of history, tradition, 
legislative process and intent, and sociological theory, all to create a 
                                                          
 191. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165. 
 192. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
(relying exclusively on the role of moral tradition—“millennia of moral teachings” 
against “homosexual sodomy”—to argue for upholding Georgia’s anti-sodomy law). 
 193. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66 (examining the necessary role of government 
in marriage). 
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rhetorically sturdy fabric of argument to support the prohibition of 
Mormon polygamy in order to maintain the prevailing family order. 
Yet there is more to judicial narratives than the architectural skill—
the aesthetics, if you will—of the crafting.  When a court reaches one 
conclusion instead of any other, that choice makes real things 
happen.  Here, the Court’s story of the need to preserve social order 
put George Reynolds in prison and compelled dramatic change in a 
community and its social and religious practices.194  The practical 
consequences of the Chief Justice’s framing of the polygamy question 
give this decision teeth sharper and jaws more powerful than come 
with most rhetorical choices.  In ruling that the Constitution could 
not protect Mormon polygamy because it was criminal conduct, 
rather than the necessary behavioral manifestation of an 
unconventional belief system (and this being a judicial decision, it 
indeed had to be one or the other), the Court in 1878 performed its 
necessary function of framing urgent social issues in order to 
determine what was legally and, at least to a refracted degree, 
culturally acceptable.  Still, that this judicial function is necessary does 
not mean that the justices’ concrete acts of framing are themselves 
immune to our scrutiny; on the contrary, it is the very quality—the 
social justification and general persuasiveness—of those framing 
decisions that makes a difference to us as members of the American 
polity. 
The late Robert Cover argued that in discursive acts such as those 
discussed above, there inheres a kind of social violence,195 and 
Stephen Carter has suggested that through such legally legitimate 
forms of rhetorical framing, a culture may marginalize, “and thus rid 
itself of . . . [the] movements . . . and religions” that threaten its 
prevailing order.196  While these ominous claims are debatable, the 
fact and the impact of judicial framing are undeniable.  Much more 
could be said here about the necessary politics of the judicial process, 
but for our discussion, suffice it to say that this socially crucial judicial 
function—the framing of issues for legal disposition—is, as an 
                                                          
 194. See id. at 168 (affirming George Reynolds’s conviction for practicing 
polygamy). 
 195. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) 
(noting that “interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence”); see 
also ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 21 (1993) (arguing that social 
constructions, “such as the law,” can bring about “the destruction of the self’s 
authenticity, the denial of subjectivity, the dismissal of experience, and the reduction 
of the self to a vessel for the interests and ends of others.”).  See generally NUSSBAUM, 
supra note 54, at xvii (examining the law from a humanistic perspective). 
 196. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 129 (1993) (asserting that “the dominant 
culture” has always “rid itself” of “marginalized and violent dissenters”). 
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especially formal and practically influential version of public 
discourse, also a potentially conducive (if specialized) medium for 
rhetorical reductivism.  Whether that actually is the case depends, of 
course, upon the quality and candor of the judicial expression at 
issue, but neither the institutional authority in which it is robed nor 
the immediacy of its social impact should prevent us from seeing that, 
like the other forms of public discourse examined here, judicial 
discourse can wield its own problematic power in the 
representation—and thus the public understanding and treatment—
of social controversies like Mormon polygamy. 
To the shock of most Mormons, George Reynolds’s conviction was 
upheld, and after failing to secure either a pardon from President 
Rutherford Hayes or a rehearing before the Supreme Court, Reynolds 
went to prison in Lincoln, Nebraska, and later in the Utah 
Territory.197  Nevertheless, the Reynolds decision empowered 
Congress to punish polygamy only through the Morrill Act, an 
unwieldy instrument at best.  It was not until 1882, with passage of the 
Edmunds Act, that Congress developed a truly efficient method for 
prosecuting polygamists: 
[The Act made it] easier to secure bigamy convictions by making it 
a crime for any male in the United States territory merely to 
cohabit—not marry—with more than one woman.  It disqualified 
from jury service in bigamy and cohabitation prosecutions all who 
believed in or practiced either polygamy or unlawful cohabitation.  
In addition, convicted bigamists and “cohabs,” as they were quickly 
dubbed, lost their eligibility to vote and to hold public office.198 
The results were significant: by 1893, after the Church had 
renounced polygamy and prosecutions had largely ceased, “there had 
been 1004 convictions for unlawful cohabitation and thirty-one for 
polygamy.”199 
The government dealt a final blow to Mormon polygamy in 1887, 
when Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which effectively 
dissolved the Church as a corporation, allowed for the confiscation of 
most Church assets, and repealed the Utah legislation granting 
women the right to vote.200  In 1890, the Church issued “The 
Manifesto,” presented as the product of divine revelation, which 
                                                          
 197. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168. 
 198. See Magrath, supra note 39, at 535. 
 199. See Firmage, supra note 38, at 775. 
 200. See Magrath, supra note 39, at 535 (writing that the Edmunds-Tucker Act 
“revoked the Utah law incorporating the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
and dissolved the corporation,” and “escheated—confiscated—almost all of the 
Church’s property except that used solely for places of worship, parsonages, and 
graveyards.”). 
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promised that Church members would cease the practice of plural 
marriage.201 
As I suggested at the outset of this section, polygamy, like 
communism or abortion or drugs or pornography, raises complex 
ethical questions about who we are, which is precisely why these issues 
generate in us moral ambivalence and stir in our society public 
controversy; it is also why we typically yield to the intoxicating power 
of didactically ordered narratives in our public representation and 
response.  But we stand to lose much in that kind of telling, for if the 
reach of our desire for mutual understanding exceeds the grasp of 
our public discourse, and this because we habitually frame the 
difficult moral issue as the easily decidable one, then we have learned 
to live in a kind of collective denial about ourselves and each other. 
III.  NOTES FROM A CURRENT NARRATIVE HOLY WAR: THE DEBATE OVER 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Small wonder, then, that the self is a public topic and that its 
“betterment” is regarded not just as a personal matter but as 
meriting the care of those charged with maintaining a proper moral 
order – the church, the school, the family, and, of course, the state 
itself.202 
– Jerome Bruner 
The only politics that can survive an encounter with this world, and 
still speak convincingly of freedom and justice and democracy, is a 
politics that can encompass both the harmonics and the 
dissonance.  The frazzle, the rubbed raw, the unresolved, the fragile 
and the fiery, and the dangerous: These are American things.  This 
jangle is our movement forward, if we are to move forward; it is our 
survival, if we are to survive.203 
– Tony Kushner 
A.  Mormon Polygamy as a Window on the Same-Sex Marriage 
Controversy 
Throughout our history, Americans have done battle over ideas of 
                                                          
 201. See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra note 29, at 183. 
[I]nasmuch as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding plural 
marriages, which laws have been pronounced constitutional by the court of 
last resort, I hereby declare my intention to submit to those laws, and to use 
my influence with the members of the Church over which I preside to have 
them do likewise. 
Id. 
 202. See JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES 69 (2002). 
 203. See TONY KUSHNER, American Things, in THINKING ABOUT THE LONGSTANDING 
PROBLEMS OF VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 10-11 (1995) (noting the need for a tolerant 
political atmosphere in all free societies). 
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community and autonomy through various languages of our 
culture,204 including religion, politics, sexuality, and, most certainly, 
the law.  Of course, ideas of community and autonomy—of the 
collective and the individual—have been in tension throughout the 
history of western civilization, particularly from the Enlightenment 
through modernity and postmodernity.205  In recent decades, for 
example, this ongoing public conversation about community and 
autonomy has manifest itself with special intensity in the work of 
liberals, like John Rawls,206 and communitarians, like Michael 
Sandel.207 
Contemporary cultural debates about the relative virtues of 
autonomy and community are, essentially, variations on the 
fundamental question that motivated Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle: 
what makes a good society?  In every epoch this core social question 
has particular context and character; in the last two centuries, issues 
that have shaped this question include the nature of human 
subjectivity, the politics of state and social power, and the role of 
language in mediating cultural conflict—the issue that this article has 
thus far addressed by focusing on how the classic community-
autonomy tension shaped the nineteenth-century public debate about 
Mormon polygamy.  As we have seen, polygamy posed a profound 
threat to prevailing notions of family, sexuality, and social order 
generally. 
Using the case of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy, I have 
explored some of the manifold rhetorical strategies that writers or 
speakers use to pursue their discursive goals.  Broadly speaking, such 
goals are invariably related to the desire to persuade others of the 
legitimacy of a certain value, opinion, perspective, ideology, or the 
                                                          
 204. See, e.g., Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, in CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL 
STUDIES, AND THE LAW (Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds., 2003) (providing a rich 
anatomy of the complex meanings of “culture”).  Thus far I have used the idea of 
“culture” primarily to characterize non-legal narratives of Mormon polygamy, such as 
“cultural narratives” versus “legal narratives” in Part II.  I recognize, however, that this 
is a necessarily artificial distinction; the term “culture” is, of course, extraordinarily 
broad in its meanings, connoting virtually every aspect of life in human communities.  
See generally Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, The Cultural Lives of Law, in LAW IN 
THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 1 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998) 
(introducing and explaining the growing field of law and culture studies). 
 205. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971) (elaborating on “the 
traditional conception of the social contract”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
xxxix (3d ed. 2005) (addressing this individual-collective tension by “consider[ing] 
whether in the circumstances of a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious 
and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, a well-ordered and stable democratic 
government is possible, and indeed even how it is to be conceived as coherent.”). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal 
Rights and Civic Virtues, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (“critiqu[ing] . . . rights-
based liberal theories associated with John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin”). 
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like.  I have considered nineteenth-century cultural208 narratives 
concerned with criticizing or embracing the experience of American 
women who chose to be part of the Mormon church and thus to 
accept the practice of polygamy.  I have also considered nineteenth-
century legal209 narratives of Mormon polygamy, narratives produced 
by judges to explain why plural marriage undertaken in the name of 
religious belief should be prohibited, and why plural marriage had to 
yield to the tradition of monogamous marriage so as to maintain 
“good social order.”210  Both kinds of narrative tended to be more 
fundamentalist than literary, although legal (judicial) narratives were 
perhaps more deliberately principled in their stated commitment to 
the related values of legal precedent and social tradition. 
My rhetorical approach to the American telling of Mormon 
polygamy over a century ago illuminates a set of contemporary social 
controversies that underscore the paradox of community and 
autonomy—namely, controversies surrounding homosexuality, 
including job and housing discrimination, military service, private 
sexual conduct, and, most recently, same-sex marriage.  In this last 
section, I will suggest ways in which the method of rhetorical analysis 
that I have established as to Mormon polygamy might inform our 
understanding of the same-sex marriage debate. 
First, I will briefly describe the same-sex marriage controversy and 
how it embodies the community-autonomy paradox in ways similar to 
those that animated the clash of public narratives over nineteenth-
century Mormon polygamy.  Next, I will analyze several narratives of 
homosexuality that are essentially fundamentalist, narratives mainly 
having to do with the issue of homosexual marriage.  In contrast, I will 
then read several narratives of homosexuality that demonstrate 
literary qualities and thus approximate the ideal of producing crafty 
narratives of marriage, a social institution far more complex than 
most current public narratives would suggest. 
B.  The Community-Autonomy Paradox in Polygamy and 
Homosexuality 
Anyone remotely interested in American politics during the last 
several years will have noticed the enormous amount of attention 
focused on the question of whether homosexuals should be allowed 
                                                          
 208. See supra Part III.A, note 204 (qualifying the notion of “culture”). 
 209. See id. 
 210. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see also Employment 
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990) (remarking on the fact that “legislatures, of 
course, have always been ‘left free to reach actions which were in violation of social 
duties or subversive good order.’”). 
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to enter into legally recognized relationships, whether in the form of 
civil unions, or, more controversially, marriage.211  David 
Blankenhorn of the Institute for American Values, an organization 
that opposes homosexual marriage, has aptly captured the state of 
public discourse on this question: “[t]he only way anybody is talking 
about marriage these days is in the context of same-sex marriage.”212  
Indeed, in the wake of both the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas213 and the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts’ ruling in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health,214 the question of same-sex marriage has fueled unending 
cultural debate, influenced political campaigns, emboldened citizens 
to engage in civil disobedience, and led to calls for state and federal 
legislators to amend their constitutions.215  The political air is thick 
with narratives about marriage, homosexuals, and whether they 
belong together. 
Whether one individual or group “belongs” within a larger 
community (be it physical or ideological) is one of the major fault 
lines of the community-autonomy paradox, and perhaps the most 
salient in the eyes of the law, which must concern itself with problems 
and principles of fairness and justice in matters of exclusion, 
association, and identity.  In the case of nineteenth-century Mormon 
polygamy, we have seen that the Supreme Court decided that a 
singular religious community could be excluded from the protection 
of the Constitution because that community engaged in conduct that, 
although religiously motivated, was deemed harmful to marriage, 
family, and social order.216 
Consider the matrix of community and autonomy dynamics at work 
in that situation: Mormons, after years of searching for (and finally 
finding) geographic autonomy, sought legal autonomy as a unique 
religious community; many female members of that autonomous 
religious community fought for the autonomy of individual women 
                                                          
 211. See William Raspberry, Reasons for Marriage, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2004, at 
A21 (noting that “gay and lesbian couples lining up for marriage licenses” are “all 
over the news”). 
 212. See id. (quoting Blankenhorn, head of “the Institute for American Values, 
whose all-encompassing theme for the past decade has been the importance of 
marriage to the well-being of children”). 
 213. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas 
law prohibiting homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional). 
 214. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003) (holding that 
a Massachusetts licensing statute that prohibited same-sex couples from marrying 
violated the Massachusetts Constitution). 
 215. See Raspberry, supra note 211 (exploring one such cultural debate: whether 
gay marriage is beneficial to the children of such unions). 
 216. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). 
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everywhere, such that those Mormon women were part of an 
ideological community devoted to the value of personal autonomy; 
many members of that broad ideological community of feminists 
seeking autonomy excoriated the marriage practices of their Mormon 
sisters on the ground that such practices were destructive to the very 
ideal of individual autonomy that united all of them in the first place; 
and those anti-polygamy feminists were also members of a still larger 
general community that tended to excoriate Mormons because it 
viewed polygamy as destructive to proper Christian religion, to the 
conventional family structure, and to the stability of the prevailing 
social order.217 
For each individual embedded in this matrix, the tension between 
the ideals of community and autonomy truly was a paradox—an 
inevitable, complex, and unsettling state of affairs that required 
difficult personal, political, and religious choices.  Every such choice 
about cultural values and identity perforce rests on threshold 
interpretive choices—i.e., internal choices about what one believes is 
the right way to live; social choices about whether and how to 
represent one’s values to others and how to read what others are 
saying about their own values; and choices about how, in light of these 
other choices, one will speak and behave as a social actor.  As 
discussed in Part II, many or all of these critical choices are settled in 
the sense that they reflect an inherited, unexamined paradigm of 
values, in which case all other decisions are effectively pre-made. 
This is common, though not necessary, to religious belief, which 
people often invoke as the trumping perspective by which to decide 
all other matters.218  Whether that dispositive perspective be religious, 
political, or other, this is what Scholes refers to as a “fundamentalist” 
way of reading—as “zeal that often results in interpretive leaps to an 
unearned certainty of meaning”;219 what Rorty characterizes as 
“accept[ing] somebody else’s description of oneself, to execute a 
previously prepared program, to write, at most, elegant variations on 
previously written poems”;220 and what Haber sees as allowing our 
“prejudices [to] become dangerous” because “they are dogmatic, kept 
                                                          
 217. See FROISETH, supra note 96, at 116-30 (describing the plight of plural wives 
and recording their opposition to polygamy). 
 218. See id. (recounting the stories of plural wives who remained in unhappy 
marriages because they believed they were serving God). 
 219. See SCHOLES, PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, at 219 (warning readers not to take 
the unwarranted “interpretive leap” of fundamentalists despite the fact that readers 
should still “acknowledge the seriousness of fundamentalist readings”). 
 220. See RORTY, supra note 74, at 28 (encouraging open-ended, authentic thought, 
Rorty contends that “the only way to trace home the causes of one’s being as one is 
would be to tell a story about one’s causes in a new language.”). 
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hidden from view and not open to discussion.”221  In short, the 
dissonance and anxiety that come with such genuine paradoxes of 
autonomy and community tempt us to engage in our reading and 
narrating of the world simplistically, to rely on inherited 
understandings to complex problems and to express public narratives 
that reinforce this more intellectually comfortable state of affairs.  
When this is the avenue we take, we evade the challenge of creating 
our own authentic narratives that reflect the evolving realities of our 
society—realities such as the emergence of an openly gay community 
of people whose publicity narrated ways of being, much like those of 
the nineteenth-century Mormons, challenge traditional narratives of 
family, sexuality, and social order. 
This challenge has taken various forms over the last half century, 
and especially since the Stonewall riots of 1969, as the status of 
homosexuals in American society has evolved from near invisibility to 
active, open presence.222  As to homosexuality, the most current 
example of this challenge of how personally to reconcile the 
community-autonomy paradox is the problem of same-sex marriage.  
Contemporary homosexuals223 face a paradox similar to that 
experienced by nineteenth-century Mormon feminists. 
Consider, for example, the matrix of possible community-autonomy 
dynamics at work in this situation: after years of social and legal 
struggle to achieve even a partial degree of cultural acceptance and 
legitimacy, many homosexuals find themselves torn between 
profound loyalty to a hard-won gay cultural identity and a long-
desired social recognition, through marriage, for their committed life 
                                                          
 221. See HABER, supra note 79, at 1 (criticizing dogmatic prejudice while admitting 
that “we can never leave all our prejudices behind and operate from a wholly 
disinterested standpoint.”). 
 222. See Paul Halsall, Homosexuality in History: A Partially Annotated 
Bibliography (Sept. 7, 2000), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pwh/gayhistbib.html 
(keeping a continually updated bibliography on virtually all publications related to 
homosexuality).  See generally WILLIAM R. DYNES, HOMOSEXUALITY: A RESEARCH GUIDE 
(1987); THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) 
(collecting seminal theoretical and historical writings in Lesbian and Gay Studies); 
EDMUND WHITE, THE BURNING LIBRARY: ESSAYS (David Bergman ed., 1994) (compiling 
memoirs and essays that thoughtfully track the evolution of homosexuality in 
American culture over the last several decades); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: 
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999) (collecting a representative and 
fairly comprehensive collection of the work of Eskridge, probably the preeminent 
voice in gay legal scholarship); GAY MEN AT THE  MILLENNIUM: SEX, SPIRIT, AND 
COMMUNITY (Michael Lowenthal ed., 1997) (indexing contemporary gay voices). 
 223. In this article I have chosen to rely on the term “homosexual” as a fixed 
category, clearly distinct from the equally fixed category of “heterosexual.”  Although 
this binary distinction is heuristically necessary for my purposes here, I recognize that 
so clean and categorical a division is debatable; some conceive of sexual identity as a 
fluid concept, not easily or simply defined.  Indeed, the clash of diverse narratives 
about how sexual orientation should be defined is itself closely related to the 
narrative battle over same-sex marriage that I discuss in this section. 
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relationships; most openly gay people have developed, through their 
culturally communal solidarity with other homosexuals, a crucial 
sense of personal autonomy for purposes of living in an often 
homophobic American society; yet for many, loyalty to this 
foundational, sustaining community of other homosexuals is now in 
some degree of conflict with the prospect of gaining the right to 
legally marry their partners, because marriage itself has been, and 
continues to be, symbolic of the exclusion of homosexuals from the 
larger community of prevailing beliefs and practices regarding 
religion, family, and sexuality; thus to fight for and exercise the right 
to marry creates division within what has largely been, but is less and 
less, a culturally unified, even insular, gay community, because the 
choice to marry is, quintessentially, both a personal, autonomous act 
and a gesture of assimilation into the larger American community—
and thus a dilution, if not a betrayal, of the valued solidarity of the 
foundational gay community.224 
Again, as with early Mormon women, individual homosexuals 
embedded in this matrix of personal and communal values and 
loyalties face a genuine paradox—an intractable state of affairs that 
requires hard personal choices about ultimately irreconcilable matters 
of identity and self-representation.225  Also, then, for both advocates 
and opponents of same-sex marriage, the perils of fundamentalist 
reading, interpreting, and narrating are significant, for the 
temptation is great to embrace settled and certain—rather than 
ambiguous and challenging—narratives, especially on so central a 
cultural matter. 
                                                          
 224. See Michael Bronski, Why Do Gays Want to Say “I do?,” 17 Z Magazine, 14 
(Oct. 2003), available at http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Oct2003/bronski1003.html 
(suggesting that the greatest danger in this process of “narrative assimilation” is that 
gays will lose touch with their sense of autonomy as a distinct, subversive community). 
[W]hen the gay liberation movement was formed in 1969, we had a broad, expansive 
vision of social justice.  We wanted to change the world and make it better—not just 
for gay men and lesbians . . . but for everyone.  We wanted to find alternatives to the 
traditional structures under which we were raised, structures that many of us found 
insufficient to meet our needs and desires.  We aligned ourselves with other 
movements and learned from them.  We got “Gay is Good” from the Black Power 
movement’s “Black is Beautiful.”  From the new feminist movement, we learned that 
patriarchy—especially when it mandated compulsory heterosexuality—was as bad for 
queers as it was for women.  We also believed, like many feminists, that marriage was, 
at its best, an imperfect institution, and, at its worst, a dangerous one . . . .  All this, 
obviously, has changed.  The gay movement today has gone out of the radical-social-
change business and taken up a franchise in the let’s-just-fight-for-equality business. 
Id. 
 225. See id. 
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C.  The Hegemony of the Moral Syllogism: Fundamentalist Public 
Narratives of Homosexuality 
In an editorial published in the Washington Times in April 2004, 
entertainer Pat Boone sounded a moral alarm that, for its sheer 
ominousness, is resonant of Congressman McClernand’s 1860 
warning about the evils of polygamy: 
We’re at war.  And I’m not talking about the war against terrorism, 
with its dreadful daily reminders.  I’m talking about the civil—and 
increasingly uncivil—culture war now raging across America . . . .  If 
we win, we may be able to rebuild the institution of marriage as the 
sacred bedrock of American societies.  If they win, we will have 
moral anarchy . . . .  There are moral absolutes in this life—and the 
sacred institution of marriage is one of them.226 
Boone’s remarks are typical of the public narratives expressed in 
recent years by those who oppose gay marriage on religious (usually 
Christian) grounds: highly fundamentalist, in that such narratives 
deploy the language and imagery of holy war, framing the conflict in 
binary, us-versus-them terms and invoking an absolute moral authority 
to justify a conclusion of which their authors are certain.227 
Two aspects of Boone’s cultural jeremiad are especially striking as 
to the community-autonomy paradox and the fundamentalist-literary 
spectrum of narrative.  The first is that by painting this public 
controversy as a cleanly delineated “war” that, if lost, will result in 
“moral anarchy,” Boone implies that America is composed of roughly 
two warring communities, with little or nothing in between; the idea 
of an ambivalent, complex, or nuanced position on gay marriage 
seems unacceptable in this narrative.  The second is that Boone taps 
into precisely the same narrative—expressed in the form of a moral 
syllogism—upon which the Supreme Court (and most of America) 
relied in the late nineteenth century to prohibit the Mormons from 
practicing polygamy: (1) traditional marriage is “the sacred bedrock 
of American societies”; (2) permitting a different version of that 
sacred marriage concept will surely ruin marriage as we know it (this 
is the unarticulated, enthymemic minor premise); and thus (3) the 
ruin of the traditional marriage concept will ruin society—”[i]f they 
win, we will have moral anarchy.”228 
Consistent with the rules of formal logic, if the reader accepts the 
                                                          
 226. See Pat Boone, Wedded to the Original, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2004, at A20 
(voicing opposition to gay marriage). 
 227. See id. (comparing the conflict between proponents and opponents of gay 
marriage to war). 
 228. See id. (predicting the downfall of the institution of marriage if gay marriage 
is legalized). 
54
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss2/3
2006] RHETORICAL HOLY WAR 367 
major and minor premises of a given syllogism, then the conclusion 
inexorably follows.  Here, while it is difficult to dispute the empirical 
validity of the major premise (i.e., conventional heterosexual, 
monogamous marriage has been, for better or worse, the structural 
center of modern western civilizations), the minor premise—the 
unspoken assumption that allowing any variation on the established 
order of marriage will necessarily denigrate that convention—seems, 
at least on its own, far from clear, regardless of one’s views on the 
sexual orientation of individuals.229 
As in Boone’s editorial, some version of the logical syllogism is 
typically operative in all public narratives; this is especially so in legal 
reasoning, where the value of logic is paramount.230  Jerome Bruner 
evocatively makes this point about the normative nature of all 
rhetorical acts of framing, whether in conventional stories or legal 
arguments: 
Stories surely are not innocent: they always have a message, most 
often so well concealed that even the teller knows not what ax he 
may be grinding.  For example, stories typically begin by taking for 
granted (and asking the hearer or reader to take for granted) the 
ordinariness or normality of a given state of things in the world—
what ought to prevail when Red Riding Hood visits her 
grandmother, or what a black kid ought to expect on arriving at a 
school door in Little Rock, Arkansas, after Brown v. Board of 
Education struck down racial segregation.231 
As Bruner suggests, to “tak[e] for granted (and to ask the hearer or 
reader to take for granted) the ordinariness or normality of a given 
state of things in the world” is, in principle, to posit the major premise 
of an argument, whether explicitly (as in conventional arguments) or 
implicitly (as in conventional narratives—”stories”).232  Thus even 
where the speaker is a social commentator, like Boone, the framing of 
                                                          
 229. See id.  Prefacing his core conventional-marriage-as-sacred-social-foundation 
narrative, Boone appeals to the contemporary American reader’s understandable 
concern about current dangers: “We are at war.”  This otherwise common rhetorical 
strategy of appealing to something familiar to the reader in order to make a point 
about an analogically related matter is notable for where it leads: as between the 
physical “war against terrorism” and the ideological war over the meaning of 
marriage, Boone’s ensuing narrative seems to suggest that the war about marriage is 
the more consequential of the two.  If the reader is persuaded by Boone’s strategy 
and thus believes that the war for ownership of the meaning of marriage is 
paramount, then it is fair to say that devotion to the traditional concept of marriage 
has itself reached the status of religion, in addition to being an important component 
of religion. 
 230. See id. (adopting certain ideological premises and following their logic in 
order to condemn homosexual marriage). 
 231. See BRUNER, supra note 202, at 5-6. 
 232. See id. (elaborating further on the ways in which an author can use narrative 
to construct a persuasive message). 
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the terms of the argument—the “taking for granted . . . the 
ordinariness or normality of a given state of things”—is inevitably a 
normative act.233 
It is crucial to understand the rhetorical function and power of the 
moral syllogism, for these help demonstrate the basic relationship 
between the fundamentalist-literary narrative spectrum and the 
community-autonomy paradox.  First, because the act of framing a 
moral syllogism—of positing the premises of one’s argument—
inheres in all argument-narratives, it matters tremendously whether 
the speaker’s framing act is more or less fundamentalist or literary, for 
the character of the narrative follows directly from that threshold 
rhetorical decision.234  Boone’s narrative on marriage, for example, 
takes for granted both that marriage is “the sacred bedrock” of our 
society and that permitting a same-sex variation on that sacred idea 
will ruin our way of life.  As I have pointed out, while the first of these 
premises is at least empirically sound, the second is far from clear or 
persuasive except to those who already believe it; this second premise 
does not even pretend to address alternative perspectives or beliefs, 
such that the terms of the discussion are firmly set, rather than open 
to discussion, and the conclusion that permitting same-sex marriage 
will create “moral anarchy” is inevitable.  This makes for a narrative 
that leans heavily toward the fundamentalist end of the reading 
spectrum, since it both precludes open discussion and conceals any 
possible conflict or ambiguity.235 
Second, once an author has framed a narrative so as to “draft” on 
the momentum of the moral syllogism embedded in that narrative, 
the author has essentially drawn lines of ideological community, 
including, in a rhetorical sense, those who agree with the author’s 
premises, excluding those who disagree, and possibly persuading 
those who are undecided.236  This three-part audience map will form 
and potentially evolve depending on how literary or fundamentalist 
the author makes the narrative.  Thus, for example, a narrative 
framed according to a heavily fundamentalist moral syllogism, like 
Boone’s, will yield an audience map starkly divided into just two 
                                                          
 233. See id. (discussing the use of rhetorical strategy as a means of persuading the 
reader to accept a social message). 
 234. See id. (illustrating this rhetorical strategy through the classic children’s story 
of Little Red Riding Hood). 
 235. See SCHOLES, CRAFTY supra note 62, at 231 (reasoning that “fundamentalist 
reading is always marked by shifts from the literal to the figurative—as a way of 
concealing conflicts”).  Boone’s reliance on general, unsubstantiated, figurative terms 
like “sacred bedrock” and “moral anarchy” would appear to exemplify Scholes’ point. 
 236. See Boone, supra note 226, at A20 (creating an ideological community that 
includes those who oppose gay marriage and excludes those who advocate it). 
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areas—the land of the converted and the land of the enemy—with no 
land for those in the middle.  This fundamentalist narrative approach 
makes for clearly identifiable, strictly autonomous ideological 
communities, but tends to preclude open, meaningful exchange 
between such communities as well as the possibility that someone with 
mixed views might arrive at a worthwhile conclusion.237 
The author of a more literary narrative, on the other hand, will 
tend to build upon a moral syllogism whose premises are transparent, 
openly articulated, and susceptible of reasonable inquiry and 
disagreement.238  This does not mean that the literary narrative must 
eschew commitment to particular values.  On the contrary, the literary 
narrative must be especially principled, because the moral syllogism 
upon which the narrative proceeds must bear up under ambiguity, 
complexity, and difference—and the substantive ideology of that 
moral syllogism, the speaker’s values as to that narrative, must survive 
or fail in the face of those tempering factors.239  Accordingly, the 
literary narrative will produce broader, more nuanced, more porously 
boundaried audience communities, because the underlying moral 
syllogism will not dictate a strictly divided map of the ideological 
landscape, but will instead allow for both overlap among communities 
and for one’s membership in multiple communities.240  In short, and 
at the risk of indulging in too many religious metaphors, the 
fundamentalist narrative will tend to preach to the converted, while 
the literary narrative will tend to engage with the multitudes. 
Among legal narratives of homosexuality, Justice Byron White’s 
1986 majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick is exemplary of the 
fundamentalist narrative.241  Justice White’s opinion rests on a moral 
syllogism242 about homosexuality quite similar to the moral syllogism 
                                                          
 237. See SCHOLES, CRAFTY, supra note 62, at 231 (characterizing Southern Baptists 
an example of an “autonomous ideological community”). 
 238. See id. (exemplifying this point by distinguishing acts of reading “according 
to ‘the letter’” versus reading “according to ‘the spirit’”). 
 239. See id. (regarding the idea that a story must “be open to ambiguity,” Bruner 
asserts that “there may be something more than the subtlety of narrative structure 
that keeps us from making the leap from intuition to explicit understanding, 
something more than that narrative is murky, hard to pin down.”). 
 240. See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980) (presenting an analysis similar to that of my own). 
 241. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 78 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (condoning the view “of the 
electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable,” Justice 
White takes a fundamentalist approach by aligning his views with a rigid ideological 
community). 
 242. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL 
THINKING (Nat’l Institute for Trial Advocacy 3d ed. 1997) (setting forth a federal 
appellate judge’s detailed discussion of the practical role of formal logic in the 
judicial process).  Judicial opinions typically proceed on the basis of at least one 
central syllogism, a rhetorical device well suited to the necessary judicial framing of 
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that Chief Justice Waite relied on in Reynolds.243  In Bowers, White 
initially framed the opinion by adroitly sifting alternative threshold 
questions from the question upon which he would base his reasoning: 
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against 
sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between 
homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable.  It raises no 
question about the right or propriety of state legislative decisions to 
repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state-
court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional 
grounds.  The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution 
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still 
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.244 
White re-emphasized this threshold question by observing that 
“[p]recedent aside, . . . respondent [Hardwick] would have us 
announce... a fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy.”245 
The major premise of White’s moral syllogism can be stated as a 
straightforward question: Does the Constitution provide homosexuals 
the fundamental right to have sodomy?  From here, Justice White 
follows the logical momentum of this major premise.  In William 
Eskridge’s description: 
As narrowed in this way, Hardwick’s claim struck the Supreme 
Court as unlike those in earlier privacy cases, which had arisen in 
the context of heterosexual intimacy.  Key to the Court’s analysis 
was its belief that the due process right of privacy could only be 
applied to protect those fundamental liberties “‘deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition.’”  Because “homosexual 
sodomy” had long been criminal in Anglo-American law, the Court 
held that there was no “‘deeply rooted’” liberty Hardwick could 
claim.  In the light of history, the Court majority found Hardwick’s 
                                                          
the issues in a case.  While few judicial opinions specifically identify all three formal 
parts of the syllogism (i.e., the major and minor premises and the conclusion), the 
syllogistic reasoning process is invariably at work, given the need in the common law 
judicial process to frame issues and reach conclusions on the authority of established 
precedent.  That is, the major premise of the opinion’s reasoning is typically some 
version of an established precedent—this is where the judge’s critical framing 
decision comes into play.  Once a judge frames that major premise, the scope of 
possible minor premises narrows, and, more important, the conclusion that follows 
from both premises is nearly inevitable.  This syllogistic mechanism is a salient 
example of how “logic” matters in a rhetorical way in legal reasoning: the framing of 
the major and minor premises are authorial choices, shaped by a judge’s discretion 
and values, be they principled or not; but the conclusion that follows is more 
predictable, as it is dictated by the initial premises.  Id. 
 243. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (relying on “Judeo-Christian moral standards,” 
Justice White found no fundamental right to engage in homosexual activity). 
 244. See id. at 190 (emphasis added). 
 245. See id. at 191. 
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fundamental rights claim “at best, facetious.”246 
Eskridge identifies the minor premise of White’s syllogism, which 
can be stated in relation to the major premise like this: In order to 
receive the status of “fundamental” Constitutional right claimed here, 
the right must protect behavior that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”247 
It takes little imagination to surmise what the Court’s conclusion 
would be to the question raised, in effect, by the combined premises 
of Justice White’s moral syllogism: Is consensual homosexual activity 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”?248  It seems 
certain that in no nation’s “history and tradition” is homosexual 
activity “deeply rooted.”  Accordingly, the opinion could not logically 
proceed in any direction other than it did, summarily concluding that 
private sex between consenting homosexual adults is not protected by 
the Constitution. 
It is worth noting that Justice White articulated another possible 
minor premise to go along with the requirement that the right be 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”249  Relying on 
language from Palko v. Connecticut,250 White reasoned that, to merit 
constitutional protection, homosexual sodomy would have to be one 
of “those fundamental liberties that are ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
[they] were sacrificed.’”251  Although White summarily dispensed with 
this premise as well (“[i]t is obvious to us that neither of these 
formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to 
engage in acts of consensual sodomy”)252, this “formulation” had the 
potential to produce a more literary analysis than its alternative. 
Unlike the “deeply rooted in . . . tradition” minor premise that 
White relied on, which, in fundamentalist fashion, effectively 
precluded discussion by deferring the question to the Judeo-Christian 
moral tradition, this “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
formulation might have enabled White to leaven his judicial narrative 
with greater nuance and thus engage a broader audience.253  Indeed, 
                                                          
 246. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 222, at 149 (describing the link that the Court 
perceived at the time between due process, privacy, and historical tradition) 
(emphasis added). 
 247. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (recognizing that there is a perceived link 
between due process and historical tradition). 
 248. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 251. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92. 
 252. Id. at 191. 
 253. See generally Wald, supra note 54 (asserting that, in part, it is judges’ skillful 
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the term “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” combined with 
the admonition to consider whether “liberty” or “justice would exist if 
[the claimed right] were sacrificed,” would seem to open the 
discussion of homosexuality up to a broad, culture-sensitive 
analysis.254  For example, the term “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” is far more open to various and changing behavioral norms 
than is the term “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” 
which narrows the scope of analysis to an easily categorized, 
fundamentalist recitation of the indisputable fact that Judeo-Christian 
history has not been kind to homosexuals.255  Similarly, to ask 
whether “liberty” or “justice would exist” if the right of homosexuals 
to have private, consensual, sex “were sacrificed” is a genuinely 
complex, open-ended question, at least in contemporary society.  
Thus both parts of this alternative premise would yield a more literary 
analysis of the behavior at issue in Bowers than the opinion itself 
demonstrates. 
In addition, the choice of determinative formulations that White 
applies here is crucial, for it defines ideological communities as to the 
outcome of the case—communities comprised of those readers who 
respond similarly to the decision according to shared values about, 
say, sexual identity or the right to privacy.  As it was decided, Bowers 
tended to produce sharply divided reactions and thus distinct, 
adversarial ideological communities regarding the issues at stake.  
Such divisions, while not representing physical or geographic 
boundaries, nonetheless define two virtual communities with 
opposing values, and as to public engagement and social change, the 
boundaries distinguishing such ideological communities would seem 
the more consequential. 
It may well be that the distinct communities defined by the 
controversial issue of homosexuality would be hard to integrate in any 
event, but honest, fair, meaningful dialogue is at least more possible if 
the opinion draws more flexible, negotiable ideological lines—a result 
that would have been more likely had White’s argument-narrative 
focused on the two alternative premises discussed above.  For 
example, although the majority of Americans would not choose to 
engage in homosexual activity, neither does it seem likely that a 
                                                          
use of rhetoric in their opinions that advances the law). 
 254. See id. 
 255. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 78 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (concurring with the 
majority opinion in Bowers, Chief Justice Burger relied on Judeo-Christian traditions 
opposing homosexuality to support the Court’s anti-sodomy ruling); see also 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 222, at 157-61 (providing a historical summary of laws 
criminalizing sodomy and homosexuality in countries dominated by Judeo-Christian 
religious beliefs). 
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majority would see “justice” in summarily “sacrificing” protection for 
the private sexual acts of others, even homosexuals—at least not 
without thoughtfully exploring the ramifications of the question.  
Indeed, such a malleable distinction would produce somewhat 
overlapping communities, reflecting at least a measure of shared 
ideology and thus the possibility of dialogue, understanding, and 
progress as to complex social controversies. 
In the end, White’s judicial narrative, while not unsophisticated in 
its rhetorical style, is remarkably fundamentalist in its substance, for it 
resolves the controversy before the Court by essentially asking a 
question from which only one answer could logically follow.256  White 
could have formulated other, more literary framing questions (i.e., 
major premises)257 or, as discussed above, he could have 
contemplated more culture- and context-sensitive minor premises and 
still have arrived at the same conclusion—but with the result that 
Bowers would probably have earned greater legitimacy, if not 
agreement, within both the legal community and the general 
population.  This has become increasingly clear over time given the 
enduring criticism of the opinion258—culminating in the Court’s 
pointed overruling of Bowers in 2003.259 
Fundamentalist narratives of homosexuality are not exclusive to 
those who oppose gay rights, of course, and we can look to the same-
sex marriage debate for evidence that narrators on the other side of 
the issue are capable of the fundamentalist tendency to simplify the 
complexities of both social controversy and the community-autonomy 
paradox.  Although most gays and lesbians appear to be unified 
behind the push to legalize same-sex marriage as a matter of equality, 
homosexuals nonetheless face a version of the community-autonomy 
paradox in this context as well: they fear that the assimilation required 
to embrace marriage—that most mainstream of cultural sacraments—
                                                          
 256. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 222, at 157-61 (detailing the Anglo-American legal 
tradition of prohibiting homosexual activity beginning in 1533).  Given this history, it 
would be near impossible to assert anything other than that homosexual activity was 
never “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”  Id. 
 257. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (considering shifts in 
cultural and social values before overruling Bowers: “[it] was not correct when it was 
decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.  
Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).  Cf. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 
259 (N.J.  Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), in which the New Jersey Superior Court relied 
on the polygamy-homosexuality analogy to rule that creating constitutional 
protection for same-sex marriage would open the door to similar protection for all 
manner of publicly disapproved of private sexual activity. 
 258. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 222, at 150 (explaining that a diverse group of 
critics have labeled the Bowers decision “manipulative, ignorant, inefficient, violent, 
historically inaccurate, misogynistic, authoritarian, and contrary to precedent”). 
 259. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (ending nearly two decades of the 
Court’s upholding as Constitutional state criminalization of sodomy). 
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will mean the erosion, if not the surrender, of their rich, distinct sense 
of communal autonomy—all in exchange for a generic, suffocating 
cultural status.  This fear, however justified, has led to narratives of 
same-sex marriage that embody some of the same categorical 
tendencies that characterize the fundamentalist narratives that I have 
discussed above. 
For example, the lesbian feminist writer Cheryl Clarke has 
remarked that “permanency for gays, lesbians, and other same-sex 
variants is the very prong we ‘gets hung on’ when the arguments for 
marriage equality come up.  We want that forever thing or the thing 
forever.”260  Asserting that “[m]arriage trivializes our partnerships,” 
Clarke inveighs against the mainstreaming of “our movement” by 
“liberals”: 
I am calling upon bulldaggers, dykes, faggots, feminist femmes, 
fierce sissies, and other outrageous progressive queers to have a 
major multicultural sexual liberation confabulation to take our 
movement back from liberals.  Because marriage equality with its 
rhetoric of sameness is not why we came out of the closet in 1969 or 
before.  We came out to dismantle marriage as an institution.261 
Although marriage is indeed one of the most dominant, idealized, 
heavily mediated (and mediating) of American cultural narratives,262 
marriage, like any other human relationship, is nonetheless 
inherently ambiguous, challenging, and unpredictable—a 
relationship at least as complex as the parties involved.263  Thus 
                                                          
 260. Cheryl Clarke, The Prong of Permanence: A Rant, in I DO/I DON’T: QUEERS 
ON MARRIAGE 81-82 (Greg Wharton & Ian Phillips eds., 2004) (taking the concept of 
getting “hung on” from ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 23 
(Harper Collins 1998) (1937). 
 261. Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
 262. See Bronski, supra note 224, at 17.  Bronski asserts: 
Marriage is so much the expectation and norm that even heterosexual 
couples have to explain why they don’t want to get married.  It is what we are 
all brought up to want and never given much permission to question.  It is a 
cultural myth many of us still embrace, despite all the evidence suggesting 
that “happily ever after” is more aptly applied to fairy tales than marriages.  
For some couples—straight and gay—getting married is easier than not 
getting married.  It is a learned cultural response that is easier to give in to 
than to fight. 
Id.  Bronski’s point may find support in that a growing number of books on how gays 
can plan for their weddings seem, at least by their titles, to imitate the nuptial 
narratives advertised by America’s massive marriage industry.  For example, DAVID 
TOUSSAINT WITH HEATHER LEO, GAY AND LESBIAN WEDDINGS: PLANNING THE PERFECT 
SAME-SEX CEREMONY.  See generally K.C. DAVID, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO GAY AND 
LESBIAN WEDDINGS (2005). 
 263. See Bronski, supra note 224 (explaining that marriage has long been a 
controversial institution—feminists have deplored it for subjugating women, and 
others have sought alternative intimate relationships, such as open marriages); see 
also Clarke, supra note 260, at 82 (stating that more than half of all straight marriages 
end in divorce). 
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marriage would genuinely trivialize a gay relationship only to the 
extent that the people involved took a fundamentalist, rather than a 
literary, view of the whole enterprise. 
No relationship can avoid some kind of categorization, even a 
relationship that defines itself by defying all categories.  But it is not 
the mere fact of belonging to a category, however top-heavy it may be 
with social expectation, that makes one’s experience and narration of 
that relationship a fundamentalist one.  Rather, what invites 
fundamentalist categorization is one’s unwillingness to develop 
literary habits of mind and action, one’s failure to remain vigilant 
toward the dangers of living and narrating one’s relationships in 
settled, inherited, unthinking ways.  While those who have 
experienced hurtful social or cultural marginalization (here, as to 
sexual identity) are attuned to the harms of cultural myopia and self-
righteousness in ways that beneficiaries of the status quo usually are 
not, the choice to construct literary over fundamentalist narratives is 
just that—a choice, not a given.  So to dismiss (as Clarke seems to) all 
marriage relationships as irreversibly mediated by a “rhetoric of 
sameness” and beholden to the insurmountable ideal of 
“heteronormativity” is to mimic that very rhetoric of sameness.  This 
serves only to perpetuate the kind of narrative fundamentalism 
unabashedly proclaimed by Pat Boone.264 
D.  Toward a “Crafty” Narrative of Marriage 
In bringing this article to a close, I want to return to Scholes’ 
notion of the “crafty reader,”265 an approach to public narrative that 
enables meaningfully principled yet open-ended debate about 
controversial issues—those most in need of nuanced understanding—
and, in the process, sheds light on the community-autonomy fault 
lines that run through virtually all important social conflicts.  I will 
consider a few examples of what might constitute a crafty reading of 
same-sex marriage, a stern test for any interpretive paradigm because 
of the import of the stakes and the seeming irreconcilability of the 
fundamentalist positions on either side of the issue.  To purposefully 
revise an established cultural narrative, particularly one as deeply 
                                                          
 264. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (arguing that an editorial by 
Pat Boone over-simplifies the same-sex marriage debate into two clearly defined sides, 
takes for granted that certain premises are true, and frames the debate question so 
that only one answer can result, leaving no room for open discussion). 
 265. See SCHOLES, CRAFTY, supra note 62, at 219 (characterizing the crafty reader 
as someone who “acknowledge[s] the seriousness of fundamentalist readings, while 
resisting and criticizing the zeal that often results in interpretative leaps to an 
unearned certainty of meaning, achieved by turning a deaf ear to the complexity of 
the texts themselves, their histories, and their present situations.”). 
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anchored as the traditional narrative of marriage, is a herculean 
task.266  Yet there is no acceptable alternative if we value the ideal of a 
pluralistic society.  So I submit that, short of the ideal of full 
compatibility, crafty reading offers all sides the possibility of enriched, 
elevated public discourse on this profoundly divisive issue. 
In analyzing the rhetorical holy wars over nineteenth-century 
Mormon polygamy and present-day homosexuality, I have attempted 
to explore the merits of this narrative prescription by closely reading 
what are largely fundamentalist narratives and thereby demonstrating 
the costs and limitations of the rhetorical strategies that drive them.  
In crafty narratives, by contrast, we see ways in which literary (or, 
more literary) readers deploy rhetorical strategies to produce 
narratives that more accurately represent the realities of people who 
experience, by virtue of the politicized status of their cultural 
identities, dramatic versions of the paradox of community and 
autonomy.  First, for example, consider how two judicial narrators 
frame the issues before them in two landmark legal decisions.  The 
first is from Justice Kennedy’s 1996 majority opinion in Romer v. 
Evans,267 the other from Chief Justice Marshall’s 2003 majority 
opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.268 
Justice Kennedy’s opening to the Romer opinion is, for its simple 
construction and its straightforward expression, literary in the sense 
that it directly engages us by speaking to important cultural identity 
values that most of us actually share: 
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court 
that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.”  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (parallel citations 
omitted) (1896) (dissenting opinion).  Unheeded then, those 
words now are understood to state a commitment to the law’s 
neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.  The Equal 
Protection Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to 
hold invalid a provision of Colorado’s Constitution.269 
This decision addressed the question of the constitutionality of 
Colorado’s voter-ratified Amendment 2, which would have precluded 
future anti-discrimination legislation protecting homosexuals in any 
state context.270  However, the underlying issue here—homosexual 
                                                          
 266. See Bronski, supra note 224 (asserting that marriage is so ingrained in our 
culture that it is difficult for anyone to reject the notion that marriage is always 
desirable). 
 267. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 268. 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003). 
 269. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. 
 270. See id. at 624 (quoting the textual opening of the amendment, which is 
remarkably direct in conveying its purpose: “No Protected Status Based on 
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rights—is neither mentioned nor even clearly implied.  Yet Kennedy 
subtly creates a powerful opening to a narrative argument in which, to 
be effective, he must open his readers’ minds to the possibility of a 
concept of political identity that includes homosexuals. 
Kennedy’s first rhetorical choice is to invoke the notorious 
Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,271 the late nineteenth-
century case in which the Court let stand Jim Crow laws that 
effectively preserved much of the inequality, if not the outright 
slavery, of ante-bellum America, even some thirty years after the end 
of the Civil War.  The Plessy decision is commonly invoked in 
contemporary American culture—in high school and college history 
classes and textbooks, in law school lectures, in political debates, and 
so on—to represent wrong and outdated racist attitudes of the past.  
Thus in associating himself with Justice Harlan, who famously 
dissented from that now stigmatized decision, Justice Kennedy sets a 
tone and direction for the Romer opinion that suggest long-overdue 
rectification of a broad social wrong, here the formal exclusion of gays 
and lesbians from the protection of civil rights laws, and even from 
the legislative process necessary to enact those laws.272 
Kennedy’s next move reinforces, then builds upon, this show of 
judicial reparation: having supplied a symbol of past racism and 
injustice (Plessy), Kennedy comes to the present, reminding the 
reader that Harlan’s “[u]nheeded” words “now are understood to 
state a commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of persons 
are at stake.”273  Kennedy has not randomly drawn from the past to 
argue in the present; he has chosen Harlan’s memorable cry in the 
American political wilderness as the starting point of his opinion 
because it provides an emotionally appealing and logically solid 
foundation on which to construct his explanation, indeed his 
justification, for the Court’s decision to do in 1996 for gays and 
lesbians what the Court would not do in 1896 for black Americans.274  
Kennedy’s key rhetorical strategy is to link Harlan’s now 
unobjectionable clarion call for racial justice to the esteemed 
                                                          
Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation”). 
 271. See id. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)). 
 272. See id. at 624 (quoting the text of Colorado’s constitutional amendment, 
which states “No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual 
Orientation” and that no legislative body in the state, all the way down to school 
districts, can make a law that would allow homosexuals “minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination”). 
 273. See id. at 623. 
 274. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 222, at 211-12 (stating that the denial of 
equality to African-Americans in Plessy is like the “Kulterkampf” against homosexuals, 
in that the legal denial of rights to both groups fostered animus and hatred against 
them in American society). 
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narrative that the law must, of necessity, be neutral, especially when it 
affects people’s rights.275  At first glance this may seem redundant, 
but it is by such incremental steps that today’s legal arguments 
become tomorrow’s legal rules and standards, as well as the basis for 
evolving social and cultural norms.  Thus, Kennedy has little to lose 
and much to gain, rhetorically, in stating what may seem obvious—
that the law should be neutral toward all persons.  This notion is, of 
course, basic to the American legal tradition and crucial to the 
continued political and social legitimacy of the nation’s courts, most 
of all the Supreme Court. 
Kennedy completes this moral syllogism, which will serve to flavor 
the tone and frame the reasoning of the entire Romer narrative-
argument, by making the project of judicial rectification, and the 
ethic of legal neutrality that drives it, subject to one of the federal 
Constitution’s most potent doctrines: “[t]he Equal Protection Clause 
enforces this principle [of neutrality] and today requires us to hold 
invalid a provision of Colorado’s Constitution.”276  Again, while this 
conclusion may seem (at least to a lay reader) overly deferential to the 
authority of the U.S. Constitution, not to mention self-evident, it is 
precisely such a direct appeal to established, largely unassailable 
textual authority that enables lawyers and judges to fashion the 
practically manageable questions and socially determinate solutions 
that are the essence of legal argumentation and discourse—legal 
narrative in the broadest sense.  Indeed, the narrative progress of 
conventional legal discourse depends upon an almost maddeningly 
painstaking kind of argumentation, in which the author (whether 
judge or advocate) seeks to validate her assertions by tightly weaving 
precedent and analogy as she carefully moves up and down the scale 
of abstract rules and concrete possibilities. 
Kennedy’s use of analogy is a crafty, and thus more likely 
persuasive, deployment of narrative.  This is because an analogy, 
essentially a narrative metaphor, operates by invoking something 
known or familiar—an experience, event, situation, concept, 
argument, or some combination of these and other tropes—in order 
to make accessible something unknown or unfamiliar.277  Thus when 
Kennedy invokes Plessy, he brings to mind a well established, layered 
narrative of slavery, discrimination, lack of equality, ignorance, bias, 
collective guilt, Jim Crow, segregated lunch counters, and so on.  
Whatever else he is attempting in his opening, Kennedy uses that 
                                                          
 275. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 67, at 3-6 (explaining that people use 
metaphors derived from other experiences to conceptualize all aspects of their lives). 
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familiar narrative to morally engage the reader. 
This is quite distinct from Justice White’s use of analogy in Bowers.  
There, White distinguished private, consensual, gay sex from several 
other private behaviors—among them procreation, interracial 
marriage, contraception, and abortion—to which the Court had 
previously granted constitutional protection.278  But White’s 
analogical reasoning, like his framing and application of the premises 
of his moral syllogism—asking and answering narrowly tailored yet 
broadly manipulable questions279—has the dismissive, conclusory feel 
of analysis-by-fiat: 
[W]e think it is evident that none of the rights announced in those 
cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of 
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this 
case.  No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on 
the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been 
demonstrated . . . .280 
White makes no attempt to reason about how or why sexual 
activity281 between two men is different from the intimate matters of 
marriage and procreation between a man and a woman—let alone to 
explain how the one bears no “resemblance” to the other.  White 
seems not to have wanted to engage the merits—namely, the complex 
issue of how we define, or should define, what is private or intimate 
between individuals for purposes of legal protection.282  To impose 
such a narrow, closed reading on such a broad, open issue is a 
fundamentalist narrative choice indeed. 
By contrast, Kennedy’s reading of the homosexuality in Romer is 
engaged with history and context, open and attentive to the evolution 
of moral sensibility over time.283  This is clear from the effect of the 
                                                          
 278. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (identifying the relevant 
Supreme Court decisions that are distinguishable in Justice White’s view: Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (contraception); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion)). 
 279. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-96; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 222, at 155-56, 
and accompanying text. 
 280. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (emphasis added). 
 281. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 222, at 155-56 (explaining that a trend in the 
enforcement of state anti-sodomy statutes around the time of the Bowers decision 
effectively criminalized certain sex acts between same-sex partners, but not between 
heterosexual partners).  By White’s analysis, it would have made no difference 
whether Michael Hardwick and his partner considered this sexual experience an act 
of lust, lovemaking, or both; we can infer only that what mattered was simply that the 
two were of the same sex. 
 282. See id. at 152-56 (chronicling judicial discourse on privacy between 
individuals since the nineteenth century). 
 283. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-37 (1996) (discussing the legal and 
social ramifications of Amendment 2 with significantly more thorough and nuanced 
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opening paragraph alone.  Having experienced the narrative 
resonance of Plessy, the reader is predisposed to see the more novel 
or unfamiliar situation presented in Romer in a similar light: Plessy 
meant unfair treatment of a certain class of people for unacceptable 
reasons; perhaps Romer will mean the same thing if it is not decided 
differently.  At core, Kennedy’s narrative here is a simple and 
persuasive moral allegory, engaging us, at the level of American 
cultural identity, toward what Rorty calls “[t]he process of coming to 
know oneself, confronting one’s contingency, tracking one’s causes 
home,”—which we achieve, however provisionally, by “inventing a 
new language—that is, of thinking up some new metaphors.”284 
The opening of Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in 
Goodridge is similarly crafty: 
Marriage is a vital social institution.  The exclusive commitment of 
two individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it 
brings stability to our society.  For those who choose to marry, and 
for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal, 
financial, and social benefits.  In return it imposes weighty legal, 
financial, and social obligations.285 
Marshall engages us by articulating the primary American marriage 
narrative, a narrative whose moral logic extends straight back to 
Reynolds and affirms the ideological community of traditional 
marriage advocates.  As with Kennedy’s opening in Romer, which 
effectively creates an ideological community centered on the value of 
anti-racism, this rhetorical framing makes of most readers 
(particularly advocates of traditional marriage) a coherent ideological 
community centered on the social value of marriage.  And, as in 
                                                          
reasoning than Justice White’s discussion in Bowers).  Interestingly, part of Justice 
Kennedy’s justification for finding Amendment 2 unconstitutional involves the 
Court’s treatment of Mormon polygamists in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), at 
roughly the same time that Plessy was decided.  “In Davis, the Court approved an 
Idaho territorial statute denying Mormons, polygamists, and advocates of polygamy 
the right to vote and to hold office because, as the Court construed the statute, it 
‘simply excludes from the privilege of voting, or of holding any office of honor, trust 
or profit, those who have been convicted of certain offences . . . .’”  Id. at 634.  See 
also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93 (implying a tradition-based justification of the Georgia 
anti-sodomy statute strikingly similar to the Beason Court’s benign characterization of 
the categorical scope of the territorial statute); SCHOLES, CRAFTY, supra note 62, at 219 
(explaining that a crafty reader “acknowledg[es] the seriousness of fundamentalist 
readings, while resisting and criticizing the zeal that often results in interpretive leaps 
to an unearned certainty of meaning”).  Moreover, since the crafty reader remains 
attentive to “the complexity of the texts themselves, their histories, and their present 
situations,” Justice Kennedy’s legal narrative in Romer is exemplary of crafty reading, 
supported, albeit unwittingly, by Justice Scalia in the famous opening line of his 
dissent: “[t]he Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”  See Romer, 517 
U.S. at 636 (emphasis added). 
 284. RORTY, supra note 74, at 27. 
 285. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2003). 
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Romer, this leaves only the question of the degree to which that 
community will remain intact through the next step of the court’s 
narrative-argument. 
That step takes a decidedly literary form, characterizing carefully 
and respectfully the two ideological communities in conflict over this 
issue and punctuating that pair of community narratives with a 
succinct statement of judicial purpose: 
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical 
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one 
man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral.  
Many hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical convictions 
that same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that 
homosexual persons should be treated no differently than their 
heterosexual neighbors . . . .  “Our obligation is to define the liberty 
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”286 
This last sentence offers a kind of moderating (if not re-unifying) 
judicial narrative, a reminder that courts must work to transcend, 
insofar as that is possible, the idiosyncratic limitations of the concrete 
disputes before them, and to resolve those disputes from a position of 
principle.  Here, that principle—the narrative of “liberty of all”—
echoes Kennedy’s invocation of the “law’s neutrality where the rights 
of persons are at stake.”287 
Just as Kennedy did in both Romer and Lawrence,288 here Marshall 
creates, by rhetorical appeal to a widely revered value, an ideological 
community of readers.  The court’s next step, into a copious 
discussion declaring unconstitutional the “Commonwealth[‘s]... use 
[of] its formidable regulatory authority to bar same-sex couples from 
civil marriage,”289 is where this ideological community—one unified 
by a belief in “the liberty of all”—divides into distinct interpretive 
communities along lines of religious and cultural values.  Just what 
values the ideological community of “the liberty of all” should include 
is, of course, where the bulk of the debate over same-sex marriage 
resides.  Nevertheless, Marshall’s rhetorical strategies in legally 
framing that debate are admirably literary in their open, principled 
attempt to fairly characterize and evaluate the values and complexities 
of each side.290  This, like Kennedy’s approach in Romer, stands in 
contrast to the preemptive, fundamentalist framing choices that 
                                                          
 286. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)). 
 287. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. 
 288. See id.; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
 289. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 312-13. 
 290. See FISH, TEXT IN THIS CLASS, supra note 240 and accompanying text (defining 
a literary writer as one who “will produce broader, more nuanced, more porously 
boundaried audience communities”). 
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White deploys in Bowers. 
CONCLUSION 
In a pluralistic liberal democracy, the importance of crafty narrative 
habits cannot be overestimated.  Such literary discursive methods and 
attitudes enable genuinely meaningful public discourse and the 
consequent, ongoing revision of the boundaries of ideological 
communities.  These conditions, in turn, make more possible for all 
the pursuit of legitimate individual and communal autonomy, because 
such a self-conscious, self-revising narrative ethos leads us to 
negotiate, if not resolve, our complex differences openly, such that we 
know where we stand with each other when fresh controversy invites 
our baser impulses. 
The alternative, fundamentalism of thought and speech, is 
inherently violent, imposing on ourselves and others reductive 
narratives of self and community that narrow our ethical vision and 
distort our mutual understanding—mediation of the most destructive 
kind.  Michael Bronski puts this narrative violence in the context of 
the same-sex marriage debate: 
[Y]ou don’t win the right to marry by telling the world that queer 
people’s lives are as confusing, messy, tattered, and complicated as 
heterosexual lives.  You win the right to marry, it seems, by 
presenting to the world, and to the courts, the most acceptable, 
most homogeneous, most lovable, most traditional couples (with 
kids if possible) you can find.  Given that marriage is, for everyone, 
a form of sexual regulation, it is also important to present to the 
world the most conventional images of gay behavior.291 
Without question, Bronski believes in the rightness of granting 
homosexuals equality in the marriage context.  Nevertheless, he 
suggests that the cost to homosexuals of winning the right to marry is 
perhaps too dear.  The cultural assimilation required for such 
“narrative equality” would compel gays to become truly 
fundamentalist self-narrators, borrowing and living out an oppressive 
story not affirmatively their own.292  This kind of derivative cultural 
legitimacy would come at the expense of whatever hard-earned sense 
                                                          
 291. Bronski, supra note 224.  Of course, given the universal desire for cultural 
legitimacy, it is not difficult to understand the appeal of marriage to homosexuals: 
So why would gay people want to get married?  Part of the answer is that in a 
world wracked by homophobia, getting an official okay on your relationship 
feels great.  It is validating and it mutes some of the hurt and pain inflicted 
on so many queers by their families, neighbors, co-workers, and society at 
large. 
Id. 
 292. See RORTY, supra note 74, at 27-28. 
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of autonomy homosexuals, as individuals and as a community, have 
achieved. 
The consequences of our fundamentalist habits of mind are all 
about us, in our political campaigns, our culture wars, our shrill 
internet blogging.  The world we inhabit reminds us daily that such 
habits of mind, when indulged to the extreme, pose serious danger to 
intellectual freedom, to cultural tolerance, and to social peace.  This 
need not be the path we take, though it is surely the easiest one. 
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